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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. The Problem 
The Colombian presidential election of 1970 created one 
of the most serious political crises the country has faced 
since 1948; the near end of traditional rule. This entailed 
the threat of defeat by an outside party of the National 
Front. 
Since 1958 Colombia had been governed by the Frente 
Nacional, or National Front, an unusual form of coalition 
arrangement between the two major political parties. This 
arrangement can be called unusual because the rules govern-
ing the National Front were incorporated into the 
Constitution which, among other things, provided that the 
coalition agreement should last sixteen years. The Frente 
Nacional had the effect of institutionalizing, or "freezing," 
electoral competition between the two principal political 
parties. This meant that the parties would endorse a 
single, mutually acceptable candidate on a rotation basis 
and that the voters would ratify the convention's choice. 
Political power was arranged between the two parties in 
such a way that third parties were placed at a considerable 
disadvantage in gaining power by excluding them from any 
1 
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meaningful role in government. Although there were several 
third party challenges, none had seriously threatened the 
existence of the Frente Nacional until 1970. 1 The challenge 
came from the Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO) , or National 
Popular Alliance. This party was organized by ex-dictator 
Guastavo Rojas Pinilla. He had run the country from 1953 
until his overthrow in 1957, and he used this party to 
return to power. In his first effort to win the presidency 
in 1962, he polled a mere two per cent of the vote, but his 
electoral strength grew. By 1966 ANAPO won 28 per cent of 
the vote with a Liberal stand-in candidate for Rojas. While 
ANAPO seemed to gain strength, the voter turnout for the 
National Front candidates declined. Based on this trend, 
some persons forecasted that Rojas Pinilla could become a 
formidable contender for the presidency in 1970. 
In the presidential election of 1970, under National 
.Front guidelines, no Liberal candidate was permitted to run; 
this meant that it was the Conservatives' turn to nominate 
the candidate. At their convention, however, the Conserva-
t:ives could not decide on a candidate. As a means of 
resolving the deadlock, party leaders decided to allow the 
Liberal Party to serve as umpire and make the final selec-
tion. The nominees not receiving the Liberals' support ran 
their own campaigns as splinter candidates. 
of the 
polled 
mances 
1The National Popular Allianye received 28 per cent 
vote ih 1966, and the Revolutionary Liberal Movement 
24 per cent in 1962. These were the best perfor-
by third parties until 1970. 
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At first it appeared that, despite these divisions, the 
official candidate would win easily because he had the sup-
· port of the Liberal and Conservative party leaderships. 
However, many people underestimated the strength of ANAPO. 
Under Rojas Pinilla, ANAPO campaigned for an end to the 
National Front as well as an end to government 'by the tradi-
tional parties. The margin of victory by the National Front 
candidate was so slim--1.5 per cent of the vote--that the 
government had to impose a state of siege and a curfew in 
order to maintain control over the situation. Thus the 1970 
presidential election can be said to have produced a crisis 
situation because it was an extremely close one in which one 
nearly victorious candidate had advocated the end of tradi-
tional rule for Colombia. 
The presidential campaign posed several questions 
dealing with the effect of the National Front on the two 
major political parties and the relationship between the 
elite and the counter-elite in Colombia. The elite in this 
study refers to the power structure of the national commu-
nity. The elite occupies "those positions in society which 
are at the summits of the key social structures," or the 
higher positions in such areas as government, the economy, 
mass media, and others. 2 The counter-elite is that portion 
of the elite which has been denied a part in the government. 
The questions investigated in this thesis are: 
2seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari, eds., Elites in 
Latin America (New York, 1967), p. vii. 
L What effect has coalition government in 
Colombia had on the two party system and on third 
party movements? 
2. What campaign style might political par-
ties, accustomed to a monopoly of political power, 
use upon suddenly finding themselves threatened by 
another party? 
3. How does the political elite in a country 
such as Colombia react to the challenge of a 
counter-elite in order to preserve its prearranged 
control over the country and to maintain its posi-
tion of institutionalized power? 
In order to answer the above questions, this thesis will 
test the following hypotheses: 
1. In a system such as in Colombia where two 
political parties vie for power, then agree to form 
a coalition, the results tend to produce an increase 
in intra-party competition which creates a greater 
danger of a split in the party. 
2. Because the coalition participants are 
accustomed to a monopoly of power, they tend not 
to perceive counter-elite challenges to be a 
threat, and this might induce the coalition to 
complacency before a challenge by a popular dema-
gogue. 
3. Because of this complacency, the politi~ 
cal parties in Colombia behave as if the challenge 
did not exist, and they react to it, if at all, 
only at the latter stages of the campaign. 
B. Methodology and Data 
The research method used in this thesis is the use of 
the case study. The 1970 presidential election is paten-
tially a very important one for Colombia because of the 
crisis produced by it; however, it has been almost totally 
ignored by students of Colombian politics. As a result, an 
essentially descriptive study of the election is in order. 
4 
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This does not mean that there will be no analysis of events 
nor an attempt to compare the 1970 election with other ones 
where it is relevant. 
But, as indicated earlier, the scope of this thesis is 
largely limited to the following: first, to a detailed 
examination of only one election and an analysis of the 
techniques employed by the Colombian elite during the presi-
dential election campaign of 1970; second, to the campaign 
styles of the various candidates in that election; third, to 
an analysis of the election returns; and, finally, to an 
evaluation of the effects of the National Front on the 
traditional elite himself. 
Since the 1970 presidential election is not an isolated 
event, Chapter II deals with the aspects of party identifi-
cation which affected the election campaign and its outcome. 
What conditions allowed Rojas Pinilla to build his political 
party from almost nothing into a national power? What effect 
did the nominating conventions have on the National Front's 
ability to wage a successful campaign? What were the major 
characteristics of the party system at the time of the elec-
tion? To answer these questions the author has consulted 
various secondary sources in both English and Spanish., ,.,,For 
materials on the party conventions he has turned principally 
to those newspapers listed on Page 7. 
Chapter III is concerned with the election campaign 
from the conclusion of the nominating conventions to election 
day. The main purpose of this chapter is to indicate 
6 
patterns in the actions of various segments of the elite 
during the campaign and to deal with the issues presented in 
the contest. Information for this chapter comes almost ex-
clusively from newspapers which have given detailed accounts 
of campaign activities. How did the various candidates 
organize their respective campaign efforts? To what imme-
diate issues did the candidates address themselves during 
the campaign and did these change during the campaign? What 
was the position of government officials toward the campaign? 
Did they alter their attitudes toward it near the end? 
Finally, what kind of press coverage did the candidates 
receive and did it change in the later stages of the cam-
paign? 
Chapter IV deals with the election itself. Like the 
previous chapter, most of the information comes from the 
same newspapers. It considers the events of election day 
and its immediate aftermath as well as an analysis of the 
election data. These data are made available from two 
government sources given on Page 8. The principal purpose 
of this chapter is to determine the techniques used by 
the elite to handle the crisis resulting from the election 
and to determine who had voted for whom and why. What 
was the reaction of the people to the election returns? 
How did the government cope with the resulting popular reac-
tion, and how effective were these measures? Employing the 
election data, what is the relationship between the degree of 
urbanization and voting for a particular candidate? Were 
there any regional patterns in the voting? How did the 
National Front fare in areas of traditional support for the 
Liberal Party or for the Conservative Party? Also, how did 
the National Popular Alliance fare in these same areas? 
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The last chapter seeks to relate the previous analysis 
to the confrontation in the presidential election between 
the National.Front and the ANAPO. The conclusions reached 
in the other chapters will be brought to bear on the central 
questions raised in this thesis. 
The author has used both primary and secondary sources 
while conducting this research. Books and articles in both 
English and Spanish have been consulted. This thesis uses 
three types of primary sources, the most important of which 
are newspapers which have supplied eyewitness accounts and 
segments of speeches. The four most valuable for the 
research are: El Tiempo, El Siglo, El Colombiano, and 
La Prensa. La Prensa of Buenos Aires, Argentina, has good 
coverage of the election from the United Press and serves 
as an impartial, outside source. Another reason for select-
ing this newspaper is that it was readily available to the 
researcher. El Tiempo of Bogota is one of the most important 
newspapers of the Liberal Party and enjoys much prestige in 
Colombia as well as some international recognition. El 
Siglo of Bogota, although not as prestigious as El Tiempo, 
is one of the more important newspapers of the Conservative 
Party; however, this paper backed one of the splinter 
8 
candidates rather than the National Front nominee. To 
consult a Conservative newspaper supporting the National 
Front candidate, the researcher turned to El Colombiano of 
Medell.in, which is one of the more important Conservative 
papers outside the capital city. Thus a balance is 
maintained by having a Liberal newspaper, a Conservative 
paper from a dissident faction, a Conservative newspaper 
supporting the National Front, and an impartial source. 
Unfortunately no newspaper from ANAPO is available. These 
newspapers have been consulted on a daily basis during the 
entire time of the nominating conventions, the campaign, and 
; 
the post-election crisis. They were consulted for the 
campaign issues, campaign styles, the attitudes of various 
groups within ~he elite toward each other, and the attitudes 
takerr by the newspapers to the candidates. 
Another primary source is aggregate election data. 
These come from government agencies such as the Registraduria 
Nacional del Estado Civil and .the Departarnento Administrative 
Nacional de Estadistica. The third primary source is per-
sonal observation. The author was present in Colombia during 
the election campaign and will add comments based on his own 
experiences and recollections of various aspects of the 
campaign. 
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c. Literature Review 
In conducting the above research, there were few 
secondary sources dealing with the 1970 presidential elec-
tion, either in English or Spanish. Perhaps the best in 
·English is Miles Williams' "El Frente Nacional: Colombia's 
Experiment in Controlled Democracy. 113 Williams is concerned 
with the overall aspects of the National Front, focusing 
principally on trends in voting. This work will be partic-
ularly valuable in Chapter IV. The author has provided some 
motivational studies of the electorate, and he shows some 
electoral trends between 1958 and 1970. However, Williams 
says almost nothing about the dynamics of the campaign and 
not anything concerning the crisis resulting from the elec-
tion. 
Saturnina Sepulveda Nino, in his Elites colombianas en 
crisis: de partidos policlasistas ~ partidos monoclasistas, 
offers a study of the Colombian elite. 4 He does offer some 
analysis of the election results, which can be used in 
Chapter IV. Furthermore, Sepulveda describes the campaign 
of each candidate in outline form. He touches briefly on 
the candidates' ideology, campaign style, and on the signi-
ficance of their movements; but the author does not go into 
3Miles Willic;i,ms, "El Fre:hte Nacional: 
Experiment in Controlled Democracy" (unpub. 
tion, Vanderbilt University, 1972). 
Colombia's 
Ph.D. disserta-
4saturnino Sepulveda Nino, Elites colombianas en 
crisis: de· partidos policalsistas a parti.dos monociasistas 
(Bogota , 19 7 o ) • 
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much detail on any item. It should be emphasized that 
Sepulveda writes from a very definite pro-ANAPO bias. This 
book is also basically descriptive rather than analytical. 
There are several works in English and Spanish which 
deal with earlier periods of the National Front, thus pro-
viding background information and setting to the present 
study. These works are useful for Chapter II, since they 
were written before 1970. James Payne, in his Patterns of 
Conflict in· Colombia, states that one of the greatest con-
cerns of Colombians is their status in society. 5 Thus he 
argues that a politician is more concerned with the status 
received from holding a particular office than with being 
informed on the policy matters with which he is confronted 
in that office. Payne then shows the importance and the 
role of status in the political parties, the Congress, and 
the presidency. He is also concerned with conflicts within 
society, such as the civil war which raged in the 1940s and 
the 1950s. 
Colombia: ~Contemporary Political Survey, by John 
Martz, provides the reader with a history of Colombia from 
1930 to 1962. 6 After an introduction to the Liberal reforms 
of the 1930s, Martz analyzes the Conservative governments of 
Mariano Ospina Perez and Laureano Gomez as well as the civil 
5James Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia 
(New Haven, 1968). 
6 J'ohn D. Martz, Colombia: . A Contemporary Poli ti cal 
Survey (Chapel Hill, 1962). 
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war which exploded at that time. He traces some of the 
policies of the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship, followed by the 
formation of the National Front. Finally he presents a 
discussion of the first presidency of the National Front 
under Alberto Lleras Camargo. 
Probably the most important recent political study is 
Colombia: 'rJ1e Political Dimensions of Change, by Robert 
Dix. 7 Dix's basic concern is political modernization and 
how this process is at work in Colombia. He makes an analy-
sis of political modernization and how it is enhanced or 
deterred by each political institution of the country: the 
government, political parties, interest groups, Church, etc. 
Perhaps the best analytical work in Spanish is Ten-
dencias de la participaci6n electoral en Colombia 1935-1966, 
written by Anita Weiss. 8 Her principal contribution is the 
analysis of voting data for that period. Some of her con-
clusions are that voting participation increased before the 
National Front was formed and that it decreased afterwards. 
After 1958 she found that voter participation in congres-
sional elections was higher than in presidential elections, 
probably due to greater intro-party competition at the con-
gressional level. The remainder of her work deals with the 
political system. 
7Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of 
Change (New Haven, 1967). 
8Anita Weiss, Tendencias de la participaci6n electoral 
en Colombia 1935-1966 (Bogota,.1968). 
Eduardo Santa wrote an excellent work on political 
sociology in his Sociologi.a poli.tica de Colombia. 9 He is 
basically concerned with the conflicts within the society, 
the struggle between the lower classes and the oligarchy. 
In ·his analysis he notes ten fissures in Colombian society 
12 
which have a bearing on the current conflicts, one of which 
is the distribution of the national income among a very 
few wealthy individuals. He asserts that violence exists 
because the political structures of the system are in a 
state of crisis. At the bottom of it are economic problems, 
which have been tolerated by the power class only because it 
has not wanted to make the necessary sacrifices to fight. 
D. Defense and Limitations of Study 
· A study of this kind has several advantages as well as 
disadvantages. One advantage enjoyed by this author is his 
familiarity with Colombia as well as his on-the-scene 
observations of the 1970 election campaign. A second advan-
tage for this study is its comprehensiveness. The author 
has employed as many sources, both in English and in 
Spanish, as possible in the research. There are, however, 
two limitations to the study which must be noted. One is 
that the thesis involves only an isolated case study, namely 
that of one election in only one country. Thus, no conclu-
· s.ive generalizations can come from the research, only 
9 Eduardo Santa, Sociologi.a poli.tica de Colombia 
(Bogota, 1964). 
13 
suggestions for further research and testing. A second 
limitation is the heavy reliance on aggregate election data, 
since survey data are not available in great quantities. As 
a result, few statements can be made concerning the indivi-
dual voter, only about groups or clusters of voters. The 
statistics are not perfectly accurate, as is true on most 
electoral information published in Latin America; however, 
they should be fairly reliable. 
As stated above, this thesis is basically descriptive 
although it will analyze events as well. It will attempt to 
determine the meaning of the election to Colombian politics 
and to show what effect the election had on future politics, 
the' coalition, and on campaign styles. Thus, rather than 
formulating a coalition model .to apply to the case at hand, 
.the .thesis develops a case study which could be used by 
-another researcher to determine the feasibility of his model. 
The election under study is important to Colombian 
politics for at least two reasons. It was the last election 
held under the National Front guidelines. Hence, the new 
president was to play a decisive role in dissolving the 
Front and in writing new rules for free competitive elec-
tions in 1·974" The election is also important because it 
divided the country almost in equal halves. It seems that a 
sizeable percentage of the people was dissatisfied with the 
policies of the National Front and demanded changes which 
the gove.rnment had failed to introduce. 
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The election is also significant for the comparative 
study of campaigns. Although there are many examples of 
coalition governments in the world, the National Front was a 
uniquely Colombian experiment. No other country has carried 
the concept of institutionalized coalitions so far as the 
National Front did. This gives the political scientist the 
opportunity to study two political parties, normally fight-
ing each other,·cooperating for the same goal. It is also 
interesting to study the election because, for the first 
time in many years, a force beyond the control of the coali-
tion participants entered the scene as a strong challenger 
to their control over the government. Thus the traditional 
leaders were compelled to combat this intruder in order to 
preserve their status and power. 
CHAPTER II 
PRELUDE TO THE CAMPAIGN 
The 1970 presidential election can be viewed as the 
culmination of many problems associated with coalition 
government in Colombia. This chapter deals with those 
characteristics of Colombian political parties and those 
historical events which had a direct impact on the election 
and its outcome. This chapter also seeks to investigate the 
strengths and weaknesses of coalition government under the 
National Front. Finally, it is concerned with the 1969 
nominating conventions. 
A. Colombian Political Parties 
One of the more outstanding characteristics of Colombian 
politics is that it has a well developed two-party system. 
Colombia is unique in Latin America in that its major 
parties had been the predominant ones since their formation 
in the mid 1800s. These two political parties, the Liberal 
and the Conservative, display many characteristics of 
parties in the United States. Neither party is highly 
disciplined. This means that almost no one is denied party 
membership because he disagrees with or votes against 
15 
the party's position on an issue. 1 The Liberals and the 
Conservatives do not represent any one social class. One 
finds members of all social classes in both parties; how-
ever, both parties appeal for lower class support. 2 The 
third similarity between the Colombian and United States 
parties is that they are non-ideological and pragmatic. 3 
They are well organized for an election campaign, but sub-
sequently their organization weakens until the next 
election. It is not uncommon to find a member of the 
16 
Liberal Party having the same ideological orientation as a 
member of the Conservative Party and vice versa. However, 
each party does have a general policy orientation. The 
Conservatives believe in the importance of the Catholic 
Church in politics and in a federal system of government. 
The Liberals, on the other hand, believe in a strict 
separation of Church and State and in a centralized form of 
government. The Conservatives are strongest in the rural 
areas and the Liberals draw their main support from the 
urban centers. 
However, there is at least one important difference 
between the political parties in Colombia and the United 
1Hugo Escobar Sierra, "Organizacion interna de los 
partidos," in Coloquios de la Universidad Externado de 
Colombia, Los Part1dos POiiITcos (Bogota, 1968), p. 34. 
2Eduardo Santa, "Las actuales estructuras politicas," 
in Coloquios de la Universidad Externado de Colombia, Los 
Partidos Poll.ITcos (Bogota, 1970), p. 66.-
3Ben G. Burnett, "The Recent Colombian Party System: 
Its Organization and Procedure" (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of California, 1957), p. 149. 
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States. That is, Colombians have a strong emotional tie to 
their respective parties. To vote for the opposition party 
rarely happens, and such an act would place the individual 
in public disgrace among his friends. It is a family tradi-
tion to belong to one political party or the other, and to 
change parties would be the same as committing an act of 
treason against one's friends. 4 The tie between the 
individual and his party is thus more emotional than intel-
lectual. Although the same could be said of the United 
States, the principal difference is one of degree. Richard 
Weinert relates the following incident which illustrates the 
extremes to which some Colombians go in order to manifest 
their loyalty to parties. This incident occurred to the 
daughter of a Conservative Party leader in the department of 
Tolima, west of Bogota: 
As a child in the 1930s, she accidentally 
intruded on a conference her father was holding 
with two peasants. Disconcerted at the conster-
nation her intrusion had caused, she later asked 
her father what she had done. He explained that 
her dress contained a red border on the neckline. 
Red is the color of the Liberal Party and the 
peasants could not fathom why her father permitted 
her to wear it.5 
In addition The Washington Post, in an article on Catholi-
cism in Colombia, reported incidents of excommunication for 
people having read El Tiempo, the leading Liberal newspaper. 
When the Conservatives were in power, attendance at Liberal 
4santa, "Las actuales estructuras politicas," p. 69. 
5Richard Weinert, "Political Modernization in Columbia" 
(unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1957), p. 52. 
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Party rallies was something that one mentioned in con-
f . 6 essions. 
This rigidity in political loyalties has led to frequent 
armed conflicts between the partisans of the two parties. 
The most recent and most violent of them, called La Violen-
cia, or Violent Era, began in 1945 and lasted until the 
1960s. 7 It is not the purpose of this thesis to analyze the 
Violent Era in detail since this is adequately done else-
where in the literature. 8 Suffice it to say that this 
period affected almost every section of the country and 
involved all classes of society. The most outstanding 
characteristic of the Violent Era was its bloodthirstiness 
and butchery; stories of genocide, rape, and torture were 
quite common. Approximately 200,000 persons lost their 
lives as Conservatives fought Liberals and Liberals fought 
Conservatives. By 1953 the fighting had become so intense 
that the Conservative government could no longer control the 
situation. Because of this and other reasons, General 
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla took over the government. This was 
the first time that the military had taken over the national 
6The Washington Post (July 11, 1975), p. C4. 
7some authors contend that the Violent Era still con-
tinues; however, after the early 1960s it was essentially 
Castro-like guerrillas advocating one of the versions of 
Communist doctrine. 
8see previous examples by Dix, Martz, and Payne; also 
Vernon Fluharty, Dance of the Millions: Military Rule and 
Social Revolution in CoIUmb--ra 1930-1956 (Pittsburg~957). 
9 government in this century. 
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Although the rise of General Rojas to power was welcomed 
by both Liberal and Conservative parties, he soon fell into 
disfavor. At first violence quieted down, but after a year 
of failure at solid reforms it began anew and with even 
greater intensity. Rojas was further discredited by his 
inability to manage the economy, and he made frequent tacti-
cal blunders in operating the government, such as his 
attempt to undermine the traditional political parties. He 
created a Third Force to replace the Liberal and Conserva-
tive parties. The movement never succeeded, partially due 
to inadequate leadership. 
By 1957 the leader of the Conservative Party, Laureano 
Gomez, who was living in Spain, and the Liberal Party leader, 
Alberto Lleras Camargo, realized that if their respective 
parties were to survive as effective political institutions, 
they would have to do something to ease the competition 
between the parties, at least for a while, since the leaders 
felt that the intense competition was the source of their 
difficulties. The solution devised for their problem was 
not unusual for Colombia, although the extent to which they 
carried it was certainly unique. The formulation of a 
coalition government had been tried many times in the past, 
most recently in the late 1940s with the National Union and 
previously under President Olaya Herrera in 1930-1934. Thus, 
9For a discussion of the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship, 
consult the references in the above footnote. 
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there were many precedents for the two major parties to act 
t h . t. f . . 10 oget er in imes o crisis. 
The basic purpose of the National Front was to restore 
domestic political peace by temporarily abating competition 
between the two parties. The party leaders hoped that the 
National Front would undo all the harm done by the Violent 
d th . d' t h' 11 c 1 b' f 1 h Era an e RoJas ic ators ip. Many o om ians e t t at 
the mere restoration of civilian government would not be a 
real solution to the country's difficulties, nor would the 
restoration of peace succeed overnight. But without poli-
tical peace the country could not progress in other areas. 
The time spent with the National Front would give the country 
a chance to perfect its democratic processes. President 
Alberto Lleras Camargo elaborated on the basic goals of the 
National Front in a speech to Congress upon assuming the 
presidency in 1958. He said: 
The country is facing many difficulties. It is 
being undermined by the Violent Era, weakened by 
prejudices and sectarian passions, and ruined by the 
government's inability to carry out social programs. 
Furthermore the country has lost the capability to 
pay for essential imports, is unable to increase do-
mestic production fast enough to meet debts in foreign 
exchange because coffee prices can be maintained only 
by artificial means due to overproduction. Therefore 
it is necessary to reestablish peace; some way to 
reach an equilibrium among the following: social 
classes, order and leadership in government, foreign 
credit, and a reasonable cost of living. All this 
must be done without destroying the economic develop-
ment which is just beginning.12 
lOW . eiss, p. 45. 
11Bernardo Gaitan Mahecha, Misi6n hist6rica del Frente 
Nacional; de la violencia a la democracia (Bogota,-1966), 
p. 43. 
12Alberto Lleras Camargo, El Primer gobierno del Frente 
Nacional (Bogota, 1960), p. 66-.-
By creating an atmosphere without underhanded 
dealings we can create formulas for pacification and 
for the reestablishment of the old national virtues 
which are expressed in the idea of joint government 
and in the temporary ending of competition for elec-
tive offices. The main explanation for this joint 
government is its necessity because it is more 
important that the Republic survive and not fall to 
its ruin by the hand of one of its political par-
ties.13 
By forming the National Front the leaders of the poli-
tical parties made two important assumptions about their 
respective parties. First, they believed that the two 
traditional parties were strong enough to survive the pre-
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scribed sixteen years of noncompetitive elections. Second, 
they believed that the Liberals and the Conservatives could 
maintain their internal cohesion, thus avoiding internal 
power struggles and factionalism. 14 
The basic organization of the National Front contained 
three iterns. 15 First was the concept of alternation. This 
meant that the presidency would alternate between the 
Liberal and Conservative parties. Thus in 1958 the presi-
dent was a Liberal, in 1962 the president was a Conservative, 
and so on until the 1974 election. The second basic prin-
ciple was parity between the parties. All seats in the 
national and local legislatures were divided evenly between 
the Liberals and the Conservatives. This equal division 
also applied to cabinet posts and to the departmental, or 
13 "d ' 60 Ibi . , p. • 
14w·11· 137 i iams, p. . 
15Dix, p. 136. 
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regional, governors. The third principle was the require-
ment of a two-thirds vote to pass legislation in Congress. 
This measure tried to create greater unity between the 
parties, but it soon proved to be an impractical measure and 
was changed to only a simple majority. 
Thus Colombia entered a period of non-competitive elec-
tions after a long history of elections in which both parties 
had parti-candidates. People have traditionally felt very 
strongly about their political affiliations. Unfortunately, 
this had led to a major civil war and a military dictator-
ship. As a result, the political leaders attempted to 
restore order by temporarily playing down the rivalry between 
the parties through the National Front. 
B. Strengths and Weaknesses of 
the National Front 
The National Front government had several strengths and 
weaknesses. Probably the greatest strength of the coalition 
was that it was able to accomplish the basic goal it set out 
to do: the restoration of domestic peace in Colombia. What 
fighting remained in the 1960s was essentially Communist 
oriented and concentrated in isolated areas. 16 The elite was 
able to remove some of the causes for the Violent Era with a 
series of moves and by coordinating efforts of the government, 
16Norman A. Bailey, "La Violencia in Colombia," Journal 
of Inter-American Studies, IX, No. 4 (October, 1967), 
p:- 568. 
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armed forces, and Church. Some examples of actions taken 
included the government's offer of complete amnesty to those 
guerrillas who would surrender their arms and take up a 
peaceful occupation. One of the programs established to 
encourage a person to seek amnesty was the Office of Reha-
bilitation which, among other things, loaned money to farmers 
to establish themselves. It also started public works to 
create new jobs. The Church assisted the pacification pro-
gram by sending missions to areas hard hit by the Violent 
Era. The armed forces also aided the government by becoming 
better trained in methods used thwarting guerrilla opera-
tions .17 
A second strength of the National Front was that its 
presidential nominees received the highest margins of support 
of any presidential elections this century in which both 
major political parties actively participated. This indi-
cated that a greater number of people were supporting, or 
at least not opposing, the National Front than had backed 
previous presidential candidates who competed for the 
office. There was less opposition and harrassment of 
presidential policies. 
In the elections held in 1958, 1962, and 1966, the 
National Front candidates won 80 per cent, 62 per cent, and 
71 per cent of the vote respectively. Table I shows the 
voting results of the elections between 1918 and 1949, the 
170 . ix, p. 378. 
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TABLE I 
COMPETITION BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
Party Per Cent 
Year Candidate Affiliation of Vote 
1949 Laureano Gomez Conservative 99.9 
Others 00.0 
1946 Mariano Ospina Perez Conservative 41.4 
Gabriel Turbay Liberal 32.3 
Jorge E. Gaitan Liberal 26.3 
1942 Alfonso Lopez Liberal 58.7 
Carlos Arango Velez Conservative 41. 4 
1938 Eduardo Santos Liberal 99.9 
Others 00.0 
1934 Alfonso Lopez Liberal 99.6 
Others 00.7 
1930 Enrique Olaya H. Liberal 44.9 
Guillermo Valencia Conservative 29.2 
Alfredo Vasquez c. Conservative 25.9 
Others 00.1 
1926 Miguel Abadia Mendez Conservative 99.9 
Others 00.1 
1922 Pedro Nel Ospina Conservative 61. 7 
Benjamin Herrera Liberal 38.2 
Others 00.0 
1918 Marco Fidel Suarez Conservative 54.0 
Guillermo Valencia 40.0 
J. M. Lombara Barrenecho 6.0 
Others 00.0 
Source: Registradur.ia Nacional de Estadistica. 
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last election before the National Front. In all competitive 
elections, the victorious candidates never received a greater 
percentage of the vote than the winners under the National 
Front. The only exceptions occurred in 1926, 1934, 1938, 
and 1948, which were in essence non-competitive elections. 
In these instances the party out of power believed itself 
sufficiently intimidated to be unable to campaign effec-
tively. For example, the party subjected to harrassment at 
their rallies or to raids on their headquarters refused to 
add legitimacy to the election by their participation. 18 
A third strength of the coalition was that the members 
of both political parties had something at stake in the 
government. This strength was established by the constitu-
tional provision that only half of the cabinet and half of 
the Congress could be a member of the president's own party. 
This assured that the opposition party would be consulted on 
governmental decisions. For example, a Liberal president 
would rely on a Conservative cabinet member for assistance 
in making a policy decision. This bipartisan arrangement 
made it impossible for one political party to make an 
all-out attack on the government, as had been customary in 
the past. Under the National Front each party had some role 
in formulating government decisions. 
18see previous reference to John Martz for a discussion 
of harrassment tactics, especially those employed in the 
1948 election. 
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However, the National Front did have some weaknesses. 
One of these was the consequence of alternating the presi-
dency between the Liberals and the Conservatives. The 
institutionalization, or "freezing" of electoral competition 
resulted in a decline in popular participation at the polls 
when compared with the voter turnout for the 1957 plebiscite 
. 19 
to approve the National Front. This decline could have 
been intended by the organizers of the National Front to 
reduce competition between the parties. This would have 
been a strength of the Front if it had not faced serious 
outside opposition. Surveys made in 1970 indicated popular 
dissatisfaction with the National Front. For example, in 
Cali 47 per cent of the people indicated discontent with the 
system or the candidate as reasons for not voting in the 
1 ' 20 Th' . f' d b '1 '11' . . 1 e ect1on. is is con irme y Mi es W1 iams in a nat1ona 
study. He reported in a survey conducted in 1964 by 
Pittsburgh University that there was a high degree of dis-
satisfaction with the National Front, but that many voters 
felt that the general situation would improve. However, 
years later Williams found that the dissatisfaction was 
taking the form of support to organizations beyond the con-
trol of the traditional political parties. 21 
19 . . Weiss, pp. 68-69. 
20Judith DeCampos and John F. Mccamant, "Colombia poli.-
tica 1971," Bolet.ln Mensual de Estadi.stica, DANE No. 242 
(September, 1971), p. 83. 
21w·11· i iams, p. 141. 
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Since the selection of National Front candidates was 
made by the leadership of the political parties and ratified 
by the national conventions, many voters felt that the can-
didate was being imposed on them. Even if they voted for 
an "illegal" candidate, that is, one running outside the 
National Front guidelines, they knew in advance that the 
official candidate would win easily. Table II shows this 
decline in popular participation. Even President Carlos 
Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970) did not get as much support as 
shown in the congressional elections before the National 
Front was created. 
A second weakness of the National Front was that it was 
unable to resolve some of the communication problems which 
had afflicted the political parties previously. Communica-
tion here refers to the passing of information between 
various levels within the political party. Both the Liberals 
and the Conservatives had taken great care in keeping their 
respective followers and local organizations informed on 
party positions and policies. However, this communication 
was essentially in one direction. The leader speaking to 
the masses was the most common method of communication in an 
attempt either to educate the public or to mobilize the 
people into supporting his program. This was a carry-over 
from the time when politics was the active concern of 
relatively few people. This means that the party leaders 
made little effort to provide effective means of communica-
tion from the masses to the top leadership. In a survey 
TABLE II 
PER CENT OF THOSE REGISTERED ACTUALLY VOTING 
IN ELECTIONS, 1946-1966 
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Election 
Number 
of Voters 
Eligible 
Voters 
% Voting of 
Those Eligible 
May 1946 
(presidential) 
March 1947 
(Chamber) 
June 1949 
(Chamber) 
Nov. 1949 
(presidential) 
Dec. 1957 
(plebiscite) 
March 1958 
(Chamber) 
May 1958 
(presidential) 
March 1960 
(Chamber) 
March 1962 
(Chamber) 
May 1962 
(presidential) 
March 1964 
(Chamber) 
March 1966 
(Chamber) 
March 1966 
(presidential) 
1,366,272 2,450,696 56 
1,472,689 2,613,686 56 
1,719,440 2,773,804 62 
1,140,646 2,856,339 40 
4,397,090 6,080,342 72 
3,693,939 5,365,191 69 
3,108,567 5,365,191 58 
2,542,651 4,397,541 58 
3,090,203 5,338,868 58 
2,634,840 5,404,765 49 
2,261,190 6,135,980 37 
2,843,450 7,126,980 40 (est.) 
2,593,705 7,126,980 36 (est.) 
Source: Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions 
of Change (New Haven, 196~ p. 162. 
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conducted by Miles Williams, it was reported that this lack 
of communication was the most serious defect Colombians 
found in their political parties. However, among politi-
cians the response was somewhat different. Many are aware 
that the communication gap does exist, but they feel that 
they are not a part of it. Half of the politicians surveyed 
stated they communicated frequently with the public, but 
Williams concludes that, although they do communicate with 
the electorate, they may not always contact a good cross 
section of it. 22 
A third weakness of the National Front was that it 
encouraged factionalism within the parties and the formation 
of third parties. These two factors helped undermine the 
invincibility of the National Front presidential candidates. 
These weaknesses almost caused the collapse of the National 
Front. The Liberal and Conservative parties have had the 
political arena almost exclusively to themselves since their 
creation in the eighteenth century. No other major political 
movement challenged them, if one excludes the military. 
However, both parties have traditionally been subject to 
factionalism. This seems to occur after one party had been 
in power for some time, and two popular personages vied for 
the presidency, thus causing a split in party ranks and 
finally its fall from power. The basis for this faction-
alism was usually personality clashes or power struggles 
22 rb~d., pp. 159-162. 
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rather than based on ideological motives. 
It was the Liberal Party which split first.after the 
formation of the National Front. However, the split did not 
last long. In 1959 Alfonso Lopez Michelson broke away from 
the Liberals and formed the Movimiento Revolucionario 
Liberal (MRL), or Revolutionary Liberal Movement. Apparently 
this new party did not antagonize the regulars of the Liberal 
Party because the MRL was accepted back into the party in 
1966, and Lopez Michelson is currently the president of 
Colombia (1974~1978) as a Liberal. 
Under the National Front the Conservative Party did not 
give any evidence of new factionalism until 1969. Before 
the National Front, the Conservatives were divided between 
Mariano Ospina Perez and Laureano Gomez, both of whom had 
been presidents. In the 1958 congressional elections the 
followers of Gomez suffered a major defeat which resulted in 
the dominance of the Ospina faction. This situation remained 
until the 1969 nominating convention. These new factions 
will be discussed in the next section. 
The only third political party of significance created 
during the National Front era is the National Popular 
Alliance (ANAPO). Although it was a separate party, it 
could not completely divorce itself from the influence of 
the traditional parties. This can be seen in its organiza-
t . . l'b 1 d . . 23 d ion into i era an conservative wings. A secon 
23 "l d ·- 74 Sepu ve a Nino, p. • 
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indicator is that, when the National Front called for a 
Conservative candidate, Rojas Pinilla, who had Conservative 
leanings, sought the nomination. When the National Front 
required a Liberal candidate, ANAPO nominated Jose Jaramillo 
Giraldo, who had previously been a member of the Liberal 
24 Party. 
In regard to the organization and the internal dynamics 
of ANAPO, little has been written. Most likely it is 
organized like other personalist parties in Latin America. 
Unlike most other splinter parties, ANAPO was organized on 
a national basis, campaigning in almost every department and 
territory. One advantage ANAPO had over the traditional 
parties was its organization at the local level, an area 
where Liberal and Conservative organizations are almost 
nonexistent. 25 In the 1970 election ANAPO showed great 
organizational skills and maintained constant contact with 
the people with its promise of reforms once it assumed 
power. In 1967 Robert Dix published the following concern-
ing ANAPO: 
In has described itself as 'a Christian and 
nationalist movement which seeks the union of the 
Liberal and Conservative populace with the aim of 
attaining power in order to put it at the service 
of the people ..• ' The emphasis instead is on 
a 'revolution' against the swindlers, against the 
empresarios of hate, against the corrupt politi-
cians, against the sordid bosses, against the 
240· 145 J.X' p • • 
25 '11' Wi iams, p. 157. 
traitorous intellectuals, against the pharisees of 
democracy, against the exporters of capital to 
Swiss and North American banks, against the real 
promoters of violence.26 
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The National Front thus headed to its final presidential 
election with both some successes to its credit and some 
failures as well. Its primary success was that it did bring 
political peace to Colombia after nearly twenty years of 
fighting. However, one aspect of its success, that of 
non-competitive presidential elections, tended to foment 
factionalism and third parties, movements which almost led 
to the collapse of the National Front. 
C. The Politics of the 1969.Conservative 
Party Convention: A Reaffirmation of 
Instability in the Colombian 
Coalition? 
Despite the aforementioned weaknesses of the National 
Front, it probably would have easily won the 1970 election 
had it not been for the division within the Conservative 
Party during its nominating convention, held on November 5, 
1969. This could be predicted, since the National Front 
had never received less than 62 per cent of the vote and 
no single opposition candidate had won more than 29 per cent. 
There were six persons seeking the Conservative nomina-
tion for president in 1970; Misael Pastrana Borrero, Jose 
26Dix, p. 283. 
Elias del Hierro, Belisario Betancur, Evaristo Sourd1s, 
Hernan Jaramillo Ocampo, and Castor Jaramillo Arruba. The 
Conservative Party suffered its first division even before 
the convention began, with the defection of Belisario 
Betancur. After pre-convention campaigning, it appeared 
that Pastrana Borrero would receive the nomination because 
33 
he had the support of party chief Ospi~a Perez and because 
he was able to get the backing of many prominent Liberals. 
Thus it appeared to Betancur that th~ convention would 
merely ratify Pastrana's nomination and leave him out of 
contention. He decided to hold his own convention, arguing 
that the upcoming Conservative convention did not really 
represent the party but only the will of Ospina Perez. 27 
He claimed that his convention was more genuinely represen-
tative of the Conservative Party. It was this claim on 
which he built the legitimacy of his own campaign for the 
presidency. 
Despite this defection, the Conservative Party's con-
vention was held as scheduled. Most observers felt that 
there would be no difficulty in selecting a candidate. Even 
Evaristo Sourdis agreed that "for all practical purposes a 
divided convention could .occur only in an extremely remote 
instance. 1128 Two days prior to the convention Pastrana felt 
that he was very close to the nomination, claiming a 
27sepulveda Nino, p. 82. 
28El Tiempo (September 1, 1969), p. 6. 
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commitment of 320 votes of a possible 600. 29 (Rules of the 
Conservative Party required the nominee to receive two-
thirds of the votes.) 
The convention began on November 5, 1969, in a carnival 
mood. The usual bands, streamers, and rallies were quite in 
evidence several hours before the meeting began. Most 
people expected the rapid nomination of Pastrana Borrero as 
the next president. However, the unexpected happened. The 
four candidates--Evaristo Sourdis, Jose Elias del Hierro, 
,Hernan Jaramillo Ocampo, and Castor Jaramillo Arruba--
believed that, if they continued with their separate 
campaigns, Pastrana would win the nomination easily. How-
ever, if they banded together, there was a good chance that 
the Pastrana campaign could be stopped. Thus they formed 
an alliance (sindicato de presidenciables) under their 
strongest member, Evaristo Sourdis. One likely consequence, 
if they were successful, would be the defeat of party chief 
Ospina Perez and his candidate. The defeat of these two men 
could have meant the alliance's control over the Conservative 
Party. Thus the Conservative Party convention can be studied 
as a double power struggle: one for the presidential nomi-
nation and the other for the control of the Conservative 
Party. On one side was party leader Ospina Perez and his 
candidate Pastrana Borrero, and on the other side was Alvaro 
Gomez Hurtado, who was appointed spokesman for the alliance, 
29 b'd 1 I 1 • , p. • 
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and his candidate Evaristo Sourdis. 
The outcome of this confrontation was without precedent 
in the history of the Conservative Party. This was the 
first time that so many persons had sought the nomination. 30 
The relative strength of both sides was not evident until 
after the first ballot in which, surprising most observers, 
Sourdis received more votes than did the heavily-favored 
Pastrana. Unfortunately, all convention balloting was done 
in secret so no analysis of the voting is possible. Both 
sides began to maneuver for a stronger position. Gomez 
Hurtado emphasized the need for unity and for a single can-
didate. He indicated that all opponents of Pastrana had 
banded together behind Sourdis. 31 El Tiempo editorially 
defended Pastrana by deploring the divisions of the Conser-
vatives and expressed a strong dislike for the alliance 
which, it felt, really stood for nothing except to stop 
Pastrana. 32 
The second ballot, cast the next day, produced even 
greater confusion: both Pastrana and Sourdis received the 
same number of votes. 33 The carnival mood at the start of 
the convention had been replaced by heated debate and much 
name calling. Never before had two candidates tied in a 
30El Colombiano (November 5, 1969), p. 1. 
31 . El Tiempo (November 6, 1969), p. 1. 
32 b'd 4 I l ., p .• 
33El Tiempo {November 7, 1969), p. 1. 
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t . 34 conven ion. The party leadership was in a quandary on how 
to handle this delicate situation. Party statutes called 
for a third ballot; however, many people were convinced that 
it would not produce a nominee. 35 Thus Ospina Perez decided 
not to call for the third ballot. This act would eventually 
serve to legitimize Sourdi.s' own campaign in view of the 
fact that he had received more votes than Pastrana on the 
first ballot and that the party leader never called for the 
third ballot as required by the party statutes. 
In place of the third ballot the convention delegates 
authorized the leaders of the two main factions to take any 
measure they felt necessary to break the deadlock. 36 How-
ever, Gomez Hurtado refused to be part of this maneuver. It 
is possible that he did not want to risk his prestige at this 
time against Ospina Perez. 37 Instead he called on Jose Elias 
del Hierro, one of the alliance members, to represent the 
faction. At first it appeared that Ospina Perez and 
del Hierro could arrive at a compromise. Ospina offered to 
present the names of both Pastrana and Sourdi.s to the 
Liberal convention and let them decide. IDel Hierro countered 
with the proposal that the two leading candidates step aside 
34Ibid. 
35El Colombiano (November 7, 1969), p. 22. 
36La Prensa (November 9, 1969), p. 2. 
37 ~ d d'd Gomez Hurta o 1 
the presidency in 1974, 
Lopez Michelson. 
receive his party's nomination for 
in a losing contest against Alfonso 
37 
and the convention be allowed to pick another candidate. 38 
However, the faction leaders quickly fell into dis-
agreement. Ospina rejected the alliance's proposal, 
arguing that the two front runners were excell.ent candidates 
who should not be denied the presidency becaus~ of internal 
party squabbles. Del Hierro rejected Ospina's plan by 
pointing out that the National Front agreement stipulated 
that for 1970 only the Conservative Party was authorized to 
make the nomination, and this meant that the Liberal Party 
was to play no active part in the decision. 39 The Liberal 
Party also refused to be drawn into this factional fight. 
They feared that their own party would become beset by 
factionalism if they tried to settle the Conservatives' 
bl . 40 pro ems. The situation became even more clouded on 
November 9, when Sourdis threatened to run as an "indepen-
d~nt" Conservative candidate if he did not receive the 
I • • 41 party s nomination. 
After three days of discussions between Ospina and 
del Hierro, an impasse had been reached. Negotiations were 
broken off and a waiting period began in order to see which 
side would give in first. With time the alliance's position 
began to weaken and the Liberals became more receptive to 
38El Tiempo (November 10, 1969) ' p. 7. 
39El Colornbiano (November 10, 1969) ' 
i 
p. 25. 
40El TiemEO (November 10, 1969)' p. 7. 
41El TiemEo (November 9, 1969)' p. 1. 
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Ospina Perez' plan. Probably the basic weakness of the 
alliance was its negative program. It never presented what 
it stood for, only what it was against: Pastrana's candi-
dacy. The Liberal Party agreed to settle the nomination for 
fear if they did not it would produce public uncertainty and 
possible chaos. 42 
With the collapse of the alliance's position, the 
candidates turned to the Liberal Party for support. How-
ever, in this contest Pastrana was the clear favorite. Even 
before the convention, the head of the Liberal Party, 
Augusto Espinosa Valderrama, stated that Pastrana was the 
candidate which represented the widest spectrum of society: 
43. 
farmers, workers, middle class, and upper class. Pastrana 
offered many assurances to the Liberal Party that he would 
execute faithfully the precepts set forth under the National 
Front and not try to undermine the strength of the Liberal 
Party: 
The candidate of the National Front cannot be 
chosen by ad hoc Conservative conventions nor can 
or should the candidate seek the support of the 
Liberal Party by trying to avoid the Liberal con-
vention, intending to fight it • . . • I am not 
and I will not be a candidate until my name has 
received the official approval of the Liberal 
Party.44 
Although the names of Evaristo Sourdis anq Belisario 
Betancur were presented to the Liberal convention, they 
42El Tiempo (November 22, 1969), p. 1. 
43El Tiempo {September 11, 1969), p. 6. 
44El Tiempo {November 21, 1969), p. 1. 
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withdrew from consideration. 45 They did not wish to compete 
for the nimination at a convention in which the outcome 
would be obviously against them. They wanted to preserve 
the legitimacy of their separate campaigns which they had 
already initiated. Sourdfs cited some "irregularities" in 
the Liberal convention as the reason for withdrawing from 
'd . 46 cons1 eration. 
The actions of the Liberal Party in face of the crisis 
in the Conservative convention may give one clue that the 
National Front has lessened the animosity between the two 
parties' leaderships. This situation might have offered the 
Liberals an excellent chance to put the Conservative Party 
in complete disarray and maybe even make it an ineffective 
organization for several years in the future. Throughout 
the struggle, however, the Liberal leaders were very careful 
not to get involved. When it finally decided to intercede, 
it did so in support of the Conservative party leader and 
not of the dissident faction. If the Liberals had supported 
the alliance, it probably would have meant the fall of 
Ospina Perez as head of the Conservative Party. In choosing 
the National Front candidate the Liberals considered the 
following: the national interest, the inteiest and security 
of the Liberal Party, and the attitudes of the candidates 
45El Tiempo (December 3, 1969), p. 1. 
46El Colombiano (December 4, 1969), p. 23. 
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toward unity and autonomy of the Liberal Party. 47 Thus on 
December 5, 1969, one month after the Conservative convention 
first met, the Liberals approved the nomination of Misael 
Pastrana Borrero for president. The convention vote was: 
Pastrana 512, Betancur 10, Sourdis 2, and 22 votes were 
blank. 48 
After receiving the nomination, Pastrana Borrero tried 
to reunite the Conservative Party under his leadership. 
He stated: 
My government will be a national one, in the 
exact sense of the word, with each party having 
equal representation and equal power . . . it will 
undertake a program of development which will bene-
fit all regions of the country • • . . This will 
be true development, the benefits of which will be 
properly distributed to all Colombians.49 
However, all such attempts at party unification were un-
successful. The other Conservative candidates were already 
too committed to their own campaigns to stop without losing 
prestige. 
Despite even these divisions it seemed that the National 
Front was rela~ively secure in getting its candidate elected. 
The only challenger, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, did not appear 
to be strong enough to challenge Pastrana. The author 
I 
recalls a United States embassy briefing he attended when 
he just arrived in Colombia, April, 1969. The political 
47El Tiempo (November 22, 1969)' p. 1. 
-
48El Tiempo (November 22, 1969) ' p. 1. 
49Ibid., p. 14. 
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officer said that Rojas Pinilla did not have a chance in the 
coming elections. 
D. Conclusions 
The stage was now set for the campaign to determine who 
would be President of Colombia for the period 1970-1974. 
This chapter has attempted to give some of the background of 
this election. Colombians have always had a very strong 
feeling toward their respective political party which, 
unfortunately, has led to several civil wars. The Violent 
Era, the most severe of these, led to a military dictator-
ship which openly challenged the existence of both political 
parties. Thus the National Front was created as a means of 
political survival for the parties. This form of government 
had several advantages as well as disadvantages. It is 
interesting to note that the National Front ended competitive 
presidential elections but, as a result, created voter 
apathy. The latter, plus the factionalism experienced in 
the Conservative nominating convention, led to the near 
collapse of the National Front. 
CHAPTER III 
THE CAMPAIGN 
This chapter is concerned with the dynamics of the 
campaign from its beginning to election day. The basic 
argument of the chapter is twofold. First, the campaign 
was essentially a struggle between Pastrana and Rojas with 
the two splinter candidates being virtually ignored by them. 
Second, the Pastrana campaign had to adapt itself to two 
different styles as a result of the effectiveness of Rojas 
Pinilla in gaining supporters. The first style, which pre-
dominated from the beginning until early March, 1970, was 
very similar to a campaign as found in a one-party nation 
like Mexico, Japan, or India. In such a campaign the 
political party has a monopoly of power and there are no 
serious rivals for political offices. Thus the political 
party can ignore, for the most part, any claims made by the 
minor parties and many times even the existence of their 
candidates. The electoral campaign becomes more of an 
opportunity for the candidate to explain his ideas to the 
people and to travel around the country to get a firsthand 
view of the problems he will be facing in office. It is 
also a chance for the local political leaders to communicate 
directly with the person who is going to assume the political 
office. 
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The second campaign style used by Pastrana, which 
continued until the election, was closer to a campaign as 
found in a multi-party system. Such a campaign is charac-
terized by the interplay of two or more candidates who take 
note of each other's existence. Not only do they attempt 
to present a program, but they also try to undermine the 
strengths of the opponents. This phase of Pastrana's 
campaign is dominated by attempts to undermine the campaign 
of Rojas Pinilla. While this style became dominant in early 
March, 1970, some traces of the previous style, principally 
that of spreading information, continued. 
Most of the information for this chapter comes from the 
newspapers mentioned in Chapter I. Newspapers represent the 
only effective means of reaching large numbers of voters in 
Colombia. This is true basically because of the limitations 
on their principal rivals, radio and television. Television 
in Colombia is relatively limited. It is a government con-
trolled monopoly which operates one channel for entertainment 
programs and another, which began in 1970, for educational 
programs. It is the government's policy to allow no adver-
tisements on television, either commercial or political. 
The only political information made available through tele-
vision were two half-hour presentations by each candidate of 
their platforms. The use of television for campaigning is 
further limited by the high price of television sets, which 
draw a high import tax. The main limitation to the use of 
radio for campaign purposes is the mountainous terrain of 
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Colombia. Most stations cannot be heard very far from the 
town where the transmitter is located. Thus, despite the 
high illiteracy rate in Colombia, newspapers remain the most 
important mass medium for a candidate to reach his audience. 
The importance of newspapers in campaigns is also confirmed 
by the conclusion reached by Ben G. Burnett who studied 
Colombian political parties in the 1950s. He said 
" ••• newspapers are among the most influential organs 
of political expression. 111 
Each of the candidates received support from news-
papers. El Tiempo and El Colombiano were the principal 
backers of Pastrana. Coverage in these papers was completely 
favorable to their own candidate and unfavorable to the 
others. 2 Sourdfs and Betancur were largely ignored, but the 
few articles that were printed were either favorable or only 
terse descriptions. In the beginning these newspapers ig-
nored Rojas Pinilla, then later heaped abuse on him during 
the last month of the campaign. El Siglo was the principal 
backer of Evaristo Sourdis. All articles were either favor-
able for Sourdis or unfavorable for Pastrana. The other 
d 'd 1 1 . d 3 can i ates were arge y ignore '· Rojas Pinilla operated 
his own private newspaper, Alerta, to support his own candi-
dacy; however, no copies of this paper were available to the i 
1 Burnett, p. 124. 
2El Tiempo had an estimated circulation of 250,000 in 
19G8 and El Colombiano had a circulation of 78,000 in 1968. 
3El Siglo had an estimated circulation of 65,000 in 1968. 
author. The author is unaware, either through research or 
by having been in Colombia during the campaign, of any 
newspaper which wholly supported the Betancur campaign. 
The campaigns of all the candidates were generally 
organized along the same lines. Since the National Front 
required that the Liberal and Conservative parties work 
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together, each candidate established a Liberal and a Con-
servative wing to their movement, even Rojas Pinilla. The 
candidates tried to get as many nationally prominent persons 
as possible to head their campaigns; however, Pastrana was 
the only one successful in this. Rojas Pinilla was the only 
famous person in his movement, Betancur received support 
from former president Guillermo Leon Valencia, and Sourdis 
lacked the support of any nationally prominent person. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into sections 
considering each candidate separately. The two splinter 
candidates are analyzed first, then the first phase of 
Pastrana's campaign, followed by Rojas Pinilla's campaign, 
and finally the second phase of the Pastrana campaign. 
A. The Sourdis Campaign 
The presidential campaign of Evaristo Sourdis Juliao 
did not begin until the meetings of the Conservative Party's 
convention. Since the candidacy was proposed mainly in 
reaction to Pastrana Borrero, it was the most poorly organ-
ized of the four candidates. The campaign also suffered 
from the lack of skilled leadership. Because of this, 
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Sourd.is concentrated most of his efforts in the' departments 
along the Caribbean coast. He had strong appeal to voters 
in this area because he was born in a small town near 
Barranquilla. He also played on the fact that many people 
living along the coast felt that their region had been neg-
~ected by the central government in Bogota. 
The main support Sourdis had enjoyed during the 
nominating convention disappeared soon afterwards. The 
"alliance" was organized only to oppose the nomination of 
Pastrana, and when they were defeated, there was no longer 
a justification for their existence. The leaders of the 
"alliance" either disengaged themselves from the campaign or 
supported another candidate. The sole exception was Jose 
Elias del Hierro who remained as the campaign manager for 
Sourdis. 
Sourdis campaigned within the National Front; that is, 
he promised that if elected he would continue the basic 
agreements between the Liberal and Conservative parties. In 
fact he claimed to be in a stronger position to make that 
statement than the other candidates since he had signed some 
of the agreements himself. H~wever, Sourdis could not 
establish himself as a national candidate, even though he 
repeatedly denied representing only the Caribbean coast. He 
did most of his campaigning along the coast, and toward the 
.end he concentrated almost exclusively in that area. For 
example, one of the headlines appearing in El Siglo read as 
follows: "If the Coast Votes United, the New President Will 
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Be Evaristo Sourdis 114 or "The Coast Will Decide the Fortunes 
of Colombia. 115 
One of the most spectacular campaign tactics of any of 
the candidates was a trip by Sourdis along the Magdalena 
River on a ferry boat. The purpose of the trip was to 
attract national attention to himself and to present himself 
as a candidate who was concerned about the "forgotten pro-
vinces" of Colombia. During his trip he spent nine days 
visiting 47 villages in nine departments. He covered 930 
kilometers and made 52 speeches before 136,000 persons. 6 
In his speeches he emphasized the importance of the Magdalena 
River system to the national economy and demanded that the 
government spend more money in the region to develop it into 
an important transportation route for national and inter-
national commerce. 7 
The principal theme of the Sourdis campaign was decen-
tralization of the political and economic life of the 
country. This, he argued, would benefit everyone. He noted 
that there was a strong trend for wealth and power to be 
centered in a few large cities, thus leaving the rest of the 
country near the poverty line. The Lleras Restrepo govern-
ment, he claimed, had no policy at all for correcting the 
4El Siglo (April 12, 1970), p. 1. 
5rbid. 
6El Siglo (January 15, 1970), p. 6. 
7El Siglo (January 14, 1970), p. 4. 
situation, in fact the government had only intensifie( 
situation. The importance of the departments as political 
and economic entities had declined to the point where they 
had little real autonomy to make important decisions con-
cerning their own affairs. The inequalities existing among 
the various regions of the country were dangerous to 
· 1 · d' d"' 8 nat1ona unity, accor ing to Sour is. 
Under a policy of decentralization more people would 
become involved in the decision-making process, which means 
that more persons have meaningful participation in the 
political system. Besides this, Sourdis ~rgued that his 
.. 
policies would render additional benefits to the country. 
The middle class would benefit because decentralization 
tends to create many small towns with about the same level 
of industrial development. Such a policy also enhances 
political stability because a group plotting to overthrow 
the government would have to control several places instead 
of a mere handful. Finally decentralization diversifies the 
vertical structures of society, promotes private enterprise, 
and encourages local talent and the exploitation of local 
natural resources. 9 
Finally, in response to Pastrana's change in campaign 
style mentioned above, from the one-party to a multi-party 
model, Sourdis did not change tactics. He claimed throughout 
8El Siglo (March 9, 1970), p. 10. 
9rbid., p. 9. 
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that Rojas was not a threat to Colombia and that Pastrana 
was trying to revive visions of the Rojas dictatorship 
merely to scare people into supporting him. Sourdis argued 
that, if Pastrana were really in trouble, then the fault 
should lay with the nominating convention which selected 
Pastrana and rejected Sourdis. In essence Sourdis said that 
Pastrana was getting exactly what he deserved. Sourdis 
rejected all government overtures to unite forces with 
Pastrana to fight Rojas Pinilla. The only solution to the 
situation he proposed was that Pastrana should withdraw from 
the campaign and support Sourdis. 
Thus one can see that Sourdis had played a small role 
in the national campaign picture, although he was a signi-
ficant force in the departments along the Caribbean coast. 
He campaigned in the traditional manner and on traditiona'l 
subject areas; however, he did not have the organization nor 
the finances to become a significant threat to the National 
Front candidate. 
B. The Betancur Campaign 
Belisario Bet~ncur Cuartas represented rebellion against 
the traditional methods of government, yet he remained within 
the framework and guidelines of the National Front. Unlike 
the other candidates, Betancur was almost completely ignored 1 
by the newspapers consulted by the author; however, what 
articles were found were generally favorable or tersely des-
criptive about the candidate. Most of Betancur's press 
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coverage came before the formal beginning of the campaign. 
Politically Betancur promised to abide by all the 
agreements of the National Front; however, it would be a 
National Front of the people and not of the oligarchy. He 
promised to represent all factions of the Conservative Party 
and to respect the rights of the Liberal Party. Betancur 
s.tated: 
I am trying to rescue the lost spirit of the 
National Front . . • the National Front has 
achieved the first stage of its original objec-
tives, the restoration of public peace, but it 
has not attained the socio-economic goals.10 
His campaign was a revolt against the elements who were 
operating the National Front, but not the system itself. 
Betancur attempted to present an image of a humble man 
who appealed directly to the people without catering to the 
oligarchy. He called himself the candidate of the poor 
people and frequently appealed to the memory of Jorge Elicer 
Gaitan, the former popular Liberal leader who was assas-
sinated in 1948. Many planks in his program could be 
described as populistic. According to Betancur, the signi-
ficance of the campaign was that: 
. . . we Colombians are resolving a challenge 
about our future, deciding what kind of leaders 
will assume power. Will a reactionary group take 
over which will continue unjust privileges and 
destroy what has been accomplished or will the 
people impose their desires? • we must end 
the system of a~irchic explosions and sporadic pro-
test movements. 
lOEl Tiempo (April 15, 1970), p. 14. 
11El Tiempo (October 16, 1969), p. 6. 
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Betancur's form of populism offered something for 
everyone. He wanted to head a government of and for the 
workers. He promised to provide more schools, housing, and 
jobs. Like Sourdis, he advocated the decentralization of 
government operations in order to increase the importance of 
the less-developed departments. Under his government there 
would be less inflation and less foreign capital which, he 
claimed, was impeding the growth of Colombian-controlled 
industry. He proposed a new tax structure which would not 
punish those with fixed incomes. 
In the face of the change in strategy on the part of 
Pastrana, Betancur, like Sourdfs, did not extend a sympa-
thetic hand. In fact, he down-played the likelihood of a 
Rojas victory: II • how desperate can the situation be 
that they forget the atrocities of the Rojas government and 
. 12 give him their support." Thus he did not see, at least 
publicly, that Rojas Pinilla was a serious threat to the 
National Front. He denied that the campaign was essentially 
a contest between Pastrana: and Rojas. Rather, he claimed 
that it was a battle between Rojas and himself. However, if 
Rojas did win, " .•. a possible triumph by Rojas ... would 
be blamed on those who support the candidacy of the imposi-
tion (Pastrana) . 1113 
12El Tiempo (April 15, 1970), p. 14. 
13Ibid. 
Thus the Betancur campaign was somewhat better organ-
ized than the one led by Sourdis. He had sufficient time 
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to become organized, and he did maintain offices in all the 
larger cities in the country. However, Betancur did not 
have the support of the prominent leaders of the Liberal or 
Conservative parties, the lone exception being former presi-
dent Guillermo Leon Valencia. 
C. The Pastrana Campaign - Phase One 
Misael Pastrana Borrero was the official candidate of 
the Liberal and Conservative parties. He received the 
backing of most nationally prominent leaders of both 
parties, but his principal supporter was the head of the 
Conservative Party, Mariano Ospina P~rez. He also received 
assistance from four other former presidents. Leaders of 
both parties campaigned actively for the candidate by 
either accompanying him on tour or by making separate cam-
paign appearances on his behalf~ 
As stated above the first phase of Pastrana's campaign 
is characterized as a campaign like one would find in a 
country with only one major political party. This phase was 
predominant from the beginning of the campaign until early 
March, shortly after President Carlos Lleras Restrepo 
entered the campaign. The National Front, because it con-
tained the two largest political parties in the country, did 
not feel that its power could be effectively challenged. 
Even with two splinter candidates, party leaders felt 
Pastrana would win handily since no Front candidate had 
received less than 60 per cent of the vote previously. 
Pastrana considered that it was sufficient for him to tour 
53 
the countryside to become acquainted with the local politi-
cal leaders and become aware of the problems of the various 
regions of the country. It afforded him the opportunity to 
explain his policies to the people and remind them of the 
recent accomplishments of the National Front. He made 
almost no reference at all to any other candidate for the 
presidency. Pastrana's campaign centered on several key 
issues: continuation of the National Front, national inte-
gration, agrarian reform, and national dialogue. 
Most of the time of this first phase was spent in 
reminding the people of the accomplishments of the National 
Front and arguing that Pastrana would continue the policies 
of previous administrations. Almost all the speeches of 
Mariano Ospina Perez were on this theme. Both men reminded 
their audiences that the National Front had brought them 
peace and that Pastrana would continue this. Pastrana stated 
that: "To preserve the understanding between the parties is 
the primary need of the country. 1114 
Pastrana spent much time in reassuring the leaders of 
both political parties that he would cooperate with them and 
not be partisan in his administration. He said that: 
14El Tiempo (January 16, 1970), p. 7. 
I want to offer a loyal presidency so that 
both Liberals and Conservatives will know that, if 
they support me, they will not be betrayed at a 
later date. The integrity of each party will be 
respected and each party will be treated as an 
equal.15 
He also stated that: 
Any policy of importance should take as its 
basic proposition the preservation of peace .•.. 
To preserve the understanding between the parties 
is the primary need of the country.16 
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He was successful in gaining the support of most Liberals as 
indicated by the statement of Hernando Agudelo Villa, a 
member of the Liberal Party leadership. He listed seven 
reasons why Liberals should support Pastrana, some of which 
were: his guarantee that he would comply with previous 
agreements, that he would work to prevent the reoccurrence 
of political violence, that he would favor a peaceful revo-
lution, and that he was the true candidate for the poor 
p.eople of Colombia. 17 
Pastrana felt that some areas of the country were being 
neglected, which posed a de-stabilizing influence on the 
country. In.order to prevent such a state of affairs, he 
advocated a program of decentralization which was similar to 
the one proposed by Sourdis. He believed that too much was 
being invested in the principal cities, such as Bogota, 
Medellin, and Cali. This resulted in the isolation and 
15El Tiempo (January 31, 1970), p. 6. 
16El Tiempo (January 16, 1970), p. 7. 
17El Tiempo (December 15, 1969), p. 20. 
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impoverishment of the rest of the country. Pastrana advo-
cated a policy in which the government should provide 
incentives to establish factories in medium-sized towns to 
take the population pressure off the major cities. 18 He 
argued that this policy would create conditions so that 
Colombians would not have to leave the countr~ to make a 
! 
living, and that it could serve as an incentive for those 
who had already departed to return to Colombia. Decentrali-
zation, he added, would ease the unemployment difficulties 
Colombia would face in the future. Pastrana predicted that 
there would be ten million new persons seeking jobs during 
19 the next ten years. 
Pastrana wanted to continue the agrarian reform poli-
cies of his predecessors: 
I will transform the country into one of the 
landowners • • • . It is not concerned simply with 
distributing land but with improving the general 
conditions of farming, raising their dignity, pro-
viding education, housing, credit, and social 
security. I will .end the two Colombias; one with 
privileges and classes, regions and large cities on 
the one hand, and the one with poverty, backward- 20 
ness, and poor neighborhoods on the other .••• 
Pastrana found that 76 per cent of the farmers had less than 
eight acres of land which made it difficult for them to lead 
a better life and which allowed few fruits of progress to 
18El Tiempo (October 21, 1969), p. 6. 
19El Colombiano (March 20, 1970), Supplement p. 4. 
20El Tiempo (December 15, 1969), p. 20. 
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h th t 'd 21 reac e coun rysi e. Pastrana proposed several govern-
ment programs which would raise the farmer's standard of 
living. He wanted to establish a program to grant credit 
to the farmers for the purchase of seeds and needed machin-
·ery. The government should provide quality seeds and 
technical assistance. Finally, Pastrana wanted to ensure 
that the farmers have a national and international market 
22 for their produce. Pastrana felt that his agrarian policy 
would incorporate the farmers into the mainstream of public 
life. The new equilibrium would help maintain social and 
political balance in Colombia. 23 
Pastrana wanted to approach these and other problems 
facing the country through a national dialogue. He wanted 
to encourage the active participation of as many groups as 
possible. It was only through this process that the country 
could attain social justice. Pastrana felt that the 
National Front had achieved political peace and should now 
focus on social justice. In order to achieve this, he 
offered a program which offered something for everyone. For 
workers Pastrana proposed the creation of a commission to 
study wages and prices, the formation of new government 
enterprises to make more jobs available, and granting labor 
21El Colombiano (January 12, 1970), p. 13. 
22El Tiempo (February 18, 1970 and March 12, 1970), 
p. 6. 
23El Tiempo (March 18, 1970), p. 6. 
a greater voice in policies affecting them. He promised 
to hold a special youth convention to allow students to 
give their views on national matters. Pastrana promised 
the students a responsible role in government-university 
relations. Finally, intellectuals would find that Pas-
trana's policy would permit the cultural life of Colombia 
to flower. 24 
Although Pastrana had the support of most of the pro-
minent politicians of the country and the support of most 
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organizations, his campaign faced several difficulties which 
weakened it considerably. Some of these were Pastrana's 
personality and frequent breakdowns in preparation for 
rallies. 
The Mi~mi Herald described Pastrana as having a 
Kennedy image, but he was shy and had to control his nerves 
before addressing large gatherings. He was incapable of 
drawing the large crowds which his chief rival could. 25 
Some people considered Pastrana as the candidate of the 
imposition. That is, he was hand-picked by Lleras Restrepo 
and Ospina P'rez without taking into consideration other 
members of the Liberal or Conservative parties. There was 
some concern that Pastrana might not be able to run the 
24El Tiempo (March 1, 1970), p. 1. 
25The Miami Herald (City Edition - April 12, 1970), 
p. 6. 
government independently from the influence of these two 
26 
men. 
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Organizational breakdowns of rallies were of two types; 
violence and occasional lack of organization. Several 
rallies for Pastrana were disrupted by followers of either 
Rojas Pinilla or Betancur. Occasionally they were able to 
disrupt the proceedings completely. There was even an inci-
dent in which one of the prominent Conservative leaders in 
the village of Caucasia was assassinated by some of the 
prominent local leaders of ANAPo. 27 Three incidents of weak 
organization have come to the attention of the author. One 
example occurred in the department of Narine where Pastrana's 
campaign workers failed to secure a balcony from where the 
candidate could speak after he arrived in the village. 28 
The second occurred in the village of Chiriguana where the 
campaign workers failed to clear the central plaza of don-
keys so that Pastrana could make an appropriate entry into 
the town. 29 The final incident, related by the political 
officer of the United States embassy, was a rally in which 
the public address system used by Pastrana never did func-
tion properly. Even though the first two incidents were 
reported by a newspaper which did not favor Pastrana, the 
26El Siglo (January 16, 1970), p. 6. 
27El Tiempo (February 8, 1970), p. 1. 
28El Siglo (February 9, 1970), p. 8. 
29El Siglo (February 27, 1970), p. 15. 
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addition of the third account could lead one to believe that 
either these events did, in fact, occur or that incidents 
similar to them did happen. 30 
Thus, by March it seemed that Pastrana was still going 
to win the election easily. He had the backing of almost 
all prominent persons in the country and most of the power-
ful political and economic organizations. However, his 
campaign seemed to be conducted in generalities and oriented 
more to the accomplishments of his predecessors. Pastrana 
had traveled to many parts of the country to explain his 
policies to the people and the local political leadership; 
however, he seemed unable to get his message across to the 
people. The campaign was also plagued by poor organization 
to present the candidate to the public. It seemed that 
Pastrana appeared to the voters as the weakest of the 
National Front candidates. 
D. The Rojas Campaign 
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla was a former military dictator 
who was making his third attempt to return to power through 
a democratic election. He ran a campaign of populism which 
advocated the end of the oligarchy's control over Colombian 
30Another incident reported by the same official was 
the reaction of at least one individual in a crowd listening 
to a campaign address given by Pastrana. When questioned 
about his reaction to the speech, the individual, a farmer, 
replied that it was the same old garbage of previous govern-
ments. 
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government. Most of his appeals were directed toward the 
lower classes. Besides Pastrana, he had the best organized 
and financed campaign in the field, if for no other reason 
but that his workers had been at their jobs for eight 
years. His movement, the National Popular Alliance (ANAPO), 
has been described as a "social, nationalist, and revolu-
tionary Christian movement and its most important goal is 
the union of the Colombian family and the glory of the 
fatherland. 1131 
Rojas' program probably would have been revolutionary 
if carried out. He offered the lower classes a better life, 
now, not sometime in the future. Rojas traveled to all 
parts of the country to speak to the people. He claimed to 
be the only candidate for the presidency who was not taking 
d f f . d. . 1 l' . 1 b 32 or ers rom oreign power or tra itiona po itica osses. 
Rojas Pinilla's campaign contained elements of either 
violence or threats of violence. In February he predicted 
that a bloody revolution would begin shortly after the 
election. 33 If his victory were disallowed by the govern-
ment, Rojas threatened to use force and "talk in all corners 
of the country with rifles and machine guns. 1134 He also 
launched veiled threats against the country's major news-
31 "'l d Sepu ve a Nino, p. 74. 
32El TiemEO (February 13, 1970) ' p. 9. 
33El TiemEO (February 1, 1970)' p. 6. 
34El TiemEO (February 2, 1970)' p. 6. 
papers and the national legislature, which had earlier 
stripped him of all his political rights. Probably his 
most important threat to the oligarchy came at the end of 
his second televised address in which he said: 
The oligarchy will lose nothing. The only 
thing they are going to lose is power, which will 
pass from the oligarchy's hands to the hands of 
the Liberals and Conservatives in my movement.35 
While threatening violence during and after his cam-
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paign, he promised peace during and after the election. He 
made frequent references that he would not take revenge on 
his opponents: 
I have never in my life taken anything that 
belonged to someone else • Money does not 
interest me • there is no other president who 
has received more gifts of gratitude from the 
people than me.36 
I say to my friends that the victor must be 
magnanimous. I do not want blood, I do not want 
more sorrow for Colombians, and I want the people 
to receive happily this change in the system of 
government which will favor everyone.37 
Rojas Pinilla advocated several government reforms. 
Under his government any official abusing his position would 
be summarily dismissed. He proposed that the government sell 
all its official vehicles and use the money saved from not 
using them for the schools. Rojas Pinilla wanted to make 
the bureaucracy smaller and more responsive to the people. 
He pointed out that the bureaucracy under his leadership in 
35El Tiempo (April 10, 1970)' p. 9. 
36El Tiempo (April 17, 1970)' p. 14. 
-
37El Tiempo (April 10, 1970), p. 9. 
the 1950s was composed of only 10,000 civil servants while 
it had grown to 140,000 by 197o. 38 
In foreign policy Rojas Pinilla wanted to abolish the 
entire ministry of foreign relations because they did not 
· serve any useful function. He argued that they were un-
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necessary since Colombia was not going to become involved in 
a war. Rojas also considered the United Nations and the 
Organization of American States as useless organs because 
they were unable to handle the crises placed before them. 
He cited the OAS' inability to resolve the so-called "Foot-
ball War" between Honduras and El Salvador as a case in 
. 39 point. 
In economic policies the poor people would receive the 
benefits. Rojas Pinilla advocated the nationalization of 
all imports which would stop the devaluation of the peso and 
h d 11 f ' . . h f l' . 40 1 t us en a uture raises in t e cost o iving. He a so 
claimed that the management techniques used by the Lleras 
government had the effect of pinching the lower class and 
41 the unemployed urban poor. Thus the lower classes were 
being squeezed by rising taxes and slowly rising inflation. 
He promised also that his government would guarantee 
all citizens their right to equal opportunity to work for the 
38 rbid. 
39La Prensa (February 18, 1970), p. 3. 
40 rbid. 
41The New York Times (April 13, 1970), p. 5. 
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betterment of Colombia. He said that he would place special 
emphasis on the rights of women, who received the right to 
vote during his former term in office. After twelve years 
of government under the National Front, Rojas Pinilla 
pointed out that people were still hungry, without shelter, 
poorly dressed, without good medical care, and that they 
had to pay a high cost for doctor's treatments. Rojas fur-
ther pointed out that every Colombian was in debt due to 
the high national debt which had risen from 760,000,000 
pesos in 1957 to 40,000,000,000 by 1970. 42 In order to ease 
everyone's financial problems Rojas promised to lower prices 
and create a stable peso. In fact he wanted to create a 
new peso, such as had been done in Brazil, which would be 
on a par with the United States dollar. This would end the 
government's policy of devaluating the peso which lessened 
the honor of Colombia. 43 
In other campaign promises he agreed to pay special 
attention to the problems of education, health, and unem-
ployment. In the interests of the people he planned to open 
all jails to release those who were being held by the Lleras 
government. 
Rojas Pinilla did not change his style at any time 
during the campaign. After all, why should he when it 
seemed that his methods would lead to victory? As early as 
42El Tiempo (April 10, 1970), p. 9. 
43El Colombiano (February 28, 1970), p. 3. 
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February, 1970, he stated, "I am no longer a candidate but 
I am president . . "44 
Thus Rojas Pinilla ran an almost victorious campaign 
by taking advantage of the weakness of the official National 
Front candidate and by appealing to those who had received 
the fewest benefits from the many programs .under the 
National Front. His party was well organized, especially 
at the local level. His proposed policies were aimed at 
the lower classes and offered them what seemed to be a 
positive program which would help them to a better way of 
life. 
E. The Pastrana Campaign - Phase Two 
As stated above this second phase of the campaign by 
Pastrana Borrero can be compared to a campaign as found in 
a country with a multi-party system. In this phase one can 
see a definite change of emphasis from merely trying to 
present his views and programs to the people to a strategy 
of trying to undermine the campaign and credibility of his 
chief rival, Rojas Pinilla. 
Recognition of the threat of Rojas Pinilla to the 
National Front began early; however, they were limited to 
editorials and political cartoons in the newspapers. Even 
these were few and far between. For example, El Colombiano 
published a cartoon depicting Rojas standing over a shredded 
44El Tiempo (February 26, 1970), p. 6. 
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Colombian constitution and a second picture of his daughter 
t d . b . . . 45 s an ing over a urning constitution. Editorials warned 
that the division of the National Front into three candi-
dates only increased the likelihood of an ANAPO victory at 
the polls. 
By late February the leaders of the two political 
parties became concerned· about Pastrana's chances of winning 
the election. The Libe'rals began an intensive program to 
stop Rojas Pinilla, calling him a grave threat to the Repub-
lic. 46 The next day the leader of the Liberal Party, 
Augusto Espinosa Valderrama, called for unity within the 
National Front or else face the possibility of victory by 
Rojas Pinilla. 
However, all attempts to slow the Rojas bandwagon 
seemed to fail. Finally on March 8, 1970, President Carlos 
Lleras Restrepo reversed his previous decision that the 
government should remain neutral during the campaign. He 
determined that, if he did not openly intervene, the 
National Front would probably lose the election. Thus on 
that date all forces had been mobilized to rescue Pastrana 
from electoral defeat. In his March 8 speech Lleras said, 
II 
• in order to defend the accomplishments of the National 
Front I am going to go out to all the villages of the 
45El Colombiano (October 5, 1969), p. 5. 
46El Tiempo (February 24, 1970), p. 1. 
country." 47 He referred to Rojas' attack on the Liberal 
Party headquarters when he was commander of the Third Bri-
gade as an example of violent acts perpetrated by Rojas. 
He pointed out that the Liberals should not support Rojas. 
Pinilla because he had appointed no one of that party to a 
position of responsibility during his government. Finally 
Lleras Restrepo appealed to the people to vote for the 
National Front so there would be no more persecutions and 
Colombia would have peace. He recounted some of the sue-
cesses of the National Front in the areas of economics, 
education, health, and so forth. 48 
Lleras Restrepo justified the change in the govern-
ment's policy toward the campaign by stating that he could 
no longer remain neutral about the future of his country: 
"I make use of the right to defend the National Front and 
I will continue to do it; I believe that Colombians like 
Liberty." 49 He accused Rojas of selling favors for import 
licenses and that he had broken his promise to the country 
t t · t" d f d to Colombi"a. 50 Th o res ore peace, JUS ice, an ree om e 
economy under Rojas had high taxes and resulted in an 
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economy of extravagance, disaster, and disorder. Rojas was 
described as only a mediocre leader who was responsible for 
47El 81' glo (M h 9 1970) 6 _ arc , , p. • 
48 rbid. 
49El Colombiano (March 16, 1970), p. 23. 
SOEl Colombianc (March 9, 1970), p. 24. 
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many disasters which had befallen Colombia since his appear-
ance on the national scene. 51 Lleras felt that statements 
such as the above were necessary, " ... to fill a vacuum 
which had been growing in the presidential campaign and to 
break the defeatist mentality which had been setting in 
among the National Front forces . • II 52 
The president's political activities were fully sup-
ported by other members of his government with the exception 
of the Procurator General, Mario Aramburu, who felt that 
Lleras Restrepo had exceeded his authority by campaigning. 
In protest he publicly offered his resignation. Lleras 
refused to accept the resignation because in doing so he 
would have indirectly admitted that Aramburu was correct. 
Lleras justified his position by stating that Aramburu's 
retention in the government would increase national harmony 
and that it was the right of a government official to criti-
53 
cize the government. 
In view of the low voting turnout in previous elections, 
the National Front leadership launched a campaign to get 
more voters to the polls. They did this by stressing the 
importance of everyone's participation in the election. 
They warned that "bad presidents are elected by good citizens 
51El Tiempo (March 16, 1970), p. 1. 
-
52El Colombiano (March 10, 1970)' p. 1. 
53El Tiempo (March 31, 1970)' p. 9. 
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who fail to vote. 1154 The Front leadership felt that a large 
voter turnout would be in their favor because these addi-
tional persons would be relatively less politically motivated 
and thus more likely to vote their party identification. 
Besides appealing for a large voter response in speeches, 
El Tiempo ran a series of headlines on its front page in 
late February which announced, "Your Vote Can Be Decisive." 
As an indicator of the seriousness of the situation, the 
headline was later changed to read, "Your Vote Is Decisive." 
These headlines did not appear in only one issue but were 
run for weeks at a time. 
One of the tactics in this phase of the campaign was an 
attempt to destroy the character of Rojas Pinilla and his 
ability to govern. He was accused of being a demogogue, 
liar, traitor, and enslaver. El Tiempo published a letter 
written by Rojas in 1957 which indicated that the dictator 
had received large loans for his private benefit by using 
h . . . . f bl 55 is government posit.ion to receive avora e terms. The 
same paper also recounted the incident of the popular Liberal 
leader Rafael Rangel Gomez. Rojas Pinilla offered this 
guerrilla leader amnesty if he laid down his arms. Rangel 
accepted the agreement; however, Rojas broke his promise and 
arrested him. 56 A third example was the accusation that 
54La Prensa (April 7, 1970), p. 6. 
55E1 Tiempo (March 13, 1970), p. 1. 
56El Tiempo (April 9, 1970), p. 19. 
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ANAPO had at least four hundred known Communists in the 
party lists for legislative seats in departments of Atlanti-
t . · c d" d · d" 57 co, An ioquia, un inamarca, Meta, an Quin io. All these 
examples were intended to show how treacherous Rojas Pinilla 
could become if he won the election. 
A second tactic used in this phase of the campaign was 
to offer Pastrana as the only alternative to a dictatorship: 
"A vote for Pastrana is a vote for the security of the 
country. Voting for Pastrana is voting against a dictator-
ship. "58 There were occasional appeals to the followers of 
the splinter candidates not to waste their votes but to 
support Pastrana to stop Rojas Pinilla. The National Front 
leaders reminded the voters that, if they really wanted 
peace, understanding, and social justice, they would not get 
them under a dictatorship, but only under the auspices of the 
National Front. Thus Pastrapa was portrayed as the candi-
date for peace. 
A third tactic used in the campaign was educating the 
people in what it was like under the Rojas dictatorship of 
the 19508 ~ The g·overnment had come to the conclusion that 
the only reason why so many people were supporting Rojas 
Pinilla was that they were too young to remember. In March, 
Carlos Lleras Restrepo said: 
57El Tiempo (April 12, 1970), p. 1. 
58El Tiempo (April 8, 1970 and April 14, 1970), p. 1. 
Much has been done in the area of social 
change, although it has been slow and difficult. 
We need to become teachers to explain the situa-
tion to the people. Today I am going to give a 
history lesson to remind you of certain things 
you may have forgotten. I want you to think of 
the.children who we want to see grow up without 
persecution and not suffer as previous genera-
tions have done, such as the one under General 
Rojas. For this reason we need to preserve peace 
and freedom .•.• 59 
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Many leaders felt that twelve years of peace had erased many 
memories of the 1950s such as tortures, newspaper closings, 
and other atrocities. 
The process of education took many forms. One of them 
was the use of full-page advertisements which appeared in 
most newspapers throughout' the country. One of these adver-
tisements called upon the people to think so that they 
could choose between violence and chaos on the one hand and 
peace and progress on the other. The presentation included 
photographs of some of the atrocities committed under the 
Rojas dictatorship such as the clash between the army and 
the students which left several students dead. The warning 
said, "Think the victims can be your brothers, or 
60 your sons, or even yourself." A second full-page 
advertisement showed how Rojas had betrayed his country. 
The first picture portrayed the people receiving Rojas as 
the savior and restorer of peace. The second photograph 
indicated that, after four years in power, Rojas had betrayed 
59El Tiempo (March 9, 1970), p. 8. 
60El Tiempo (April 5, 1970), p. 25. 
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the people by becoming a bloody dictator who, with other 
members of his family, committed all kinds of abuses of 
power and made shady business deals which enriched them at 
the expense of the country. The final picture showed the 
reaction of the people who had become aware of the misdeeds 
of Rojas and how that had led to his overthrow. 61 
The second way the National Front leaders tried to 
educate the people was through an almost constant barrage 
of anti-Rojas political cartoons in the newspapers. In an 
El Tiempo cartoon Rojas was seen fraternizing with the Vene-
zuelan dictator, Perez Jimenez. It depicted Perez Jimenez 
giving iron chains to Rojas with the instructions that they 
62 
could be used on the Colombian people. A second cartoon 
was entitled "The Golden Dream of Dictators." It showed 
Rojas dreaming of a journalist in jail who had a ball and 
chain on his leg. The journalist was reading a newspaper 
with the caption "Peruvian Press," referring to the press 
63 
censorship in that country. 
The propaganda even had a touch of humor in a photo-
graph taken by El Tiempo. It depicted a poster for Rojas 
Pinilla which someone had placed over an announcement for a 
movie, "Blood in the Bull Ring." This recalled an incident 
in the Bogota bull ring in 1956 when Rojas' daughter ordered 
61El Tiempo (April 12, 1970), p. 21. 
-
62El Tiempo (April 3, 1970)' p. 5. 
63El Tiempo (April 5, 1970), p. 5. 
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the army to open fire on spectators who had been denouncing 
• I f · 1 64 RoJas am1 y. 
A third method used to educate the public was to pub-
lish the findings of experts who analyzed the program 
presented by Rojas. In December Rojas claimed that he was 
"the candidate inspired by the will of God for the salvation 
of Colombia. 1165 In response the Pastrana forces published 
the opinions of several Church leaders on ANAPO. Their 
report dealt with sacrileges and other profanities leveled 
against the Church by Rojas as well as tales of many priests 
and students being murdered and of many tear gas bombings of 
churches. 
In April El Tiempo published a report by a group of 
experts, who remained nameless, who analyzed the program of 
Rojas Pinilla. They claimed that his economic program was 
impossible to carry out without destroying the current 
economic structure. They argued that the appreciation of 
the peso would only slow exports by making them more expen-
sive for foreigners. This would result in less .foreign 
exchange available to purchase needed imports. The country 
could not afford any more loss of funds since there was not 
quite enough to cover the current rate of imports. The 
experts found that it was impossible to lower the cost of 
living as Rojas had proposed. If agricultural prices, for 
64El Tiempo (April 8, 1970), p. 28. 
65El Tiempo (December 4, 1969), p. 6. 
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example, were lowered, then the farmers would be ruined. 
Rojas, they claimed, had overlooked the fact that one 
person's expenses were another man's income. 
The experts found that Rojas' project of decreasing the 
number of g·overnment employees would not be in the interest 
of most Colombians. There were more civil servants in the 
1970s than in the 1950s because there were more people and 
they demanded more public services such as health, educa-
tion, transportation, and housing. If the government spent 
less money, there would be fewer services available for the 
people. 
Finally, the experts decried the financial program of 
ANAPO. They found that the national debt was not excessive 
since income from imports was increasing and since the 
national debt had been greater in the past. The country, 
they argued, would be even more in debt if there was a 
shortage of foreign exchange, which would result from Rojas' 
policies. The experts praised the current government for its 
· · d · d f d' 66 austerity program an . its mo erate rate o expen itures. 
Thus, the leadership of the National Front used a 
variety of methods to meet the threat of ANAPO. They were 
employed in crescendo fashion so that by election day the 
voters were being bombarded with anti-Rojas propaganda. 
66El Tiempo (April 15, 1970), p. 14. 
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F. Conclusions 
The situation was thus set for election day, April 19, 
1970. Pastrana began his campaign in the same style as his 
predecessors had used, and they had been elected by over-
whelming majorities. As expected the two splinter candidates 
were unable to mount any serious threat of winning the 
election. However, Rojas Pinilla, through his direct appeals 
to the desires of the lower classes for a better way of life, 
immediately fQrced Pastrana to change his campaign tactics. 
Rather than ignoring Rojas, Pastrana had to confront him 
directly and attempt to discredit him. In the end the can-
didate, supported by government officials, party officials, 
and most of the mass media, was able to meet the challenge 
presented by Rojas. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE ELECTION 
This chapter deals with the events of election day and 
of those shortly thereafter which were a consequence of the 
election results. In addition it attempts to analyze some 
voting patterns in the 1970 election. The chapter is also 
concerned with the reaction of the people to the results of 
the election and what counter-measures the government took 
to preserve order. The second section discusses the effects 
which the 1970 election had upon the elite, in terms of 
policies and operating procedures. The final section is 
concerned with an analysis of the voting data in order to 
determine, among other things, where the support of the two 
principal candidates lay. 
A. The Crisis 
That this election produced a crisis came to nobody's 
surprise. The propaganda machine of Rojas Pinilla had been 
dropping hints that there would be trouble if Rojas did not 
win easily. The headline of Alerta the day before the 
elections read,"Tomorrow Rojas Will Be Elected." The 
accompanying article claimed that Rojas could lose only if 
the government committed fraud; therefore, it outlined 
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methods to prevent it. 1 Other followers of Rojas Pinilla 
proclaimed that, if he won, he should take office immedi-
ately without waiting for the expiration of Lleras' term. 
In face of these threats and also in recognition of 
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·the fact that the election would probably be close, the 
government began to take certain precautions. The military 
went on training maneuvers in downtown Bogota to familiarize 
the troops with the territory and also to serve as a warning 
to any would-be troublemaker. Government spokesmen warned 
the people that prohibition laws would be in effect on elec-
tion day and that the military would inspect civilians for 
weapons. 
Election day, April 19, went smoothly and most people 
were in a carnival mood as they went to cast their ballots. 
People were dressed their best, and the banners and symbols 
,of the candidates were everywhere. However, such an atmos-
phere lasted only until the early hours of the evening when 
the first returns became available. These initial reports 
indicated that the race between Pastrana and Rojas was 
extremely close. Which candidate was ahead at a given 
moment depended on which radio station a person listened to. 
Each radio station broadcast the results which were more 
favorable to the candidate it supported. In order to pre-
vent all this confusion in reporting, the government ordered 
all radio stations to broadcast only official reports. One 
1El Colombiano (April 19, 1970), p. 4. 
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··radio station defied the order, Radio Latina owned by Rojas 
Pinilla, and it was closed. The government justified its 
action by stating that the action would prevent disorders 
which could create illusions which, in turn, could later be 
converted into lies. 2 La Prensa of Argentina reported that, 
with four per cent of the vote counted, Rojas did, indeed, 
hold a slight lead and gave a strong showing in the cities 
of Barranquilla, Medellin, Pasto, Cali, and Ibague. 3 To add 
to the confusion, the leading Bogota newspapers of the two 
political parties could not agree who was winning. El Tiempo 
proclaimed that· Pastrana was winning while El Siglo reported 
that Rojas held a small lead. 
In face of the confusion and the closeness of the elec-
tion, the supporters of Rojas Pinilla took to the streets to 
proclaim their cause. In the first night alone about 500 
people were arrested and about $150,000 damage was made to 
government buildings, radio stations, and businesses. 4 Rojas 
Pinilla disputed the accuracy of any reports which indicated 
that he was not winning. In fact, he claimed that, accord-
ing to his own calculations, he held at least a 46,000 vote 
lead over Pastrana. 5 He further proclaimed that his party 
2El 'l'iem:120 (April 22, 1970)' p. 24. 
3La Prensa (April 20, 1970) I p. 1. 
4El Colombiano (April 20, 1970), p. 13. 
5La Prensa (April 21, 1970) ' p. 1. 
was going to defend its victory with blood and fire. 6 
The first two days after the election were ones of 
extreme tension. There was uncertainty about what Rojas 
Pinilla, the government, or the military might do next. 
Each day large crowds gathered in downtown Bogota and in 
several other major cities throughout the country. These 
effectively brought most of the economic activity of the 
country to a standstill. There were many reports of store 
windows broken and businesses looted. However, the mili-
tary was able to maintain general order with the use of 
tear gas and displays of force. Throughout the crisis the 
military completely backed the actions of the government. 
As an indication of the military's support of the govern-
ment's policies, Berbardi Camacho Leyva, head of the 
National Police, said in retrospect: 
A country like Colombia cannot permit itself 
the luxury of opening its doors to anarchy which 
leads to an abuse of political freedom. The first 
duty of governments is to organize economic pro-
duction and education . . . . Nowhere have we had 
to confront disturbances which have been signif i-
cant in regards to the peace of the nation . . • • 
What is happening in these developing countries is 
that democratic principles have not been well ab-
sorbed. It seems that people confuse democracy 
with subversion and disorder . . . • We cannot 
permit ourselves the luxury of allowing dissidents 
to ta.ke advantage of democracy as if it were an-
archy. If we permitted such acts we would be 
stimulating slavery which in turn produces misery, 
poor education and especially the inability to 
coordinate economic production in a government open 
to all kinds of outlooks on labor and social devel-
opment. 7 
6El Tiempo (April 21, 1970), p. 6. 
7El Siglo (May 11, 1970), p. 6. 
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The government's response to this challenge by Rojas 
Pinilla reveals quite possibly that the main goal of the 
National Front, that of lessening intense hatreds between 
the Liberals and the Conservatives, indeed had been success-
ful. The crisis was easily the gravest one which the 
National Front faced in its twelve year history. In face 
of many sharp and fierce attacks, the Conservative and 
Liberal parties could easily have blamed each other for 
the situation, thus dissolving the union. Instead, the two 
parties worked together, applying just the right amount of 
pressure to keep ANAPO off balance and to maintain control 
without being repressive. 
At first the government took low key actions to disband 
the crowds demonstrating for Rojas. In addition to the 
military actions described above, this step included an 
address to the nation by the President, Carlos Lleras Res-
trepo, over radio and television. The theme of his speech 
was an appeal for calm and a reassurance that the ballots 
would be counted fairly. Lleras denied any possibility of 
fraud and he promised to turn the government over to which-
ever candidate won the election. He appealed to the people 
to wait until the election results had been finalized before 
taking to the streets. Finally the President reminded the 
people that the vote tabulation was conducted by the Regis-
traduria, which was a separate, independent government 
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agency free from pressures from the chief executive. 8 
As might be expected, these actions had little effect 
··on the demonstrators. Serious<. confrontations occurred in 
. -Bogota, Cali, Cartagena, and Barranquilla the day after 
Lleras' address. The government allowed these gatherings 
·to continue as long as they were relatively peaceful. But 
· ·on the evening of April 21, the national police intercepted 
two trucks of shock troops trying to enter Bogota to join 
the demonstrators. Rojas also called for a general strike 
of transportation workers, but his was only partially 
successful. A~ night fell the center of Bogota had become 
a virtual sea of humanity, and broken glass lay everywhere. 
In response to these pressures, the government took 
more severe m~asures to keep the situation under control. 
President Lle~as made his second speech to the nation since 
' ' 
the election. At first he merely repeated what he had told 
the nation the previous night. He also warned the populace 
about a possible subversion plot led by ANAPO. Lleras 
claimed that the government had the full support of the 
military and that there was no possibility of a coup d'etat 
precipitated by unruly crowds. He refused to allow any 
person or group to interfere with the counting of the 
ballots, since his was a government of laws., not demonstra-
tions. 9 Finally, Lleras warned that he would permit no 
8La Prensa (April 21, 1970), p. 1. 
9El Tiempo (April 22, 1970), p. 24. 
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further demonstrations and that the armed forces were pre-
pared to dissolve any labor strikes. 
The threats were not idle ones, however. President 
Lleras placed his personal prestige on the line to preserve 
order. He stated that: " •.• dead is the only way I will 
leave the Presidential Palace, of this fact those who are 
trying to create disorders and bre~k the peace should 
become aware • 1110 In order to back up his words with 
action, Lleras declared a nationwide state of siege and a 
curfew. For Bogota, the curfew began one hour after the 
president made his address: 
••• people have, one hour to get to their 
homes. Those who remaip outside will be appre-
hended . . . that all men and women of Colombia 
make efforts to def end the peace and become sol-
diers for freedom and justice.11 
This measure required all persons to be in their homes each 
night a.fter 9: 00 p. m. and forbade all public gatherings for 
any purpose. Any group of five or more persons would be 
dispersed by armed force. 
The speech had its desired effects. An official at the 
United States embassy, who was working that night, described 
the downtown Bogota area before the speech as so packed with 
humanity that it would be almost impossible to drive a tank 
through. Immediately after the speech all the people began 
to scatter. The official saw several overloaded buses and 
lOibid., p. 8. 
11rbid. 
taxis trying to get people home before the curfew began. 
Within hours the previously crowded downtown area was 
·deserted. 
In spite of all this, ANAPO leaders still claimed 
victory and refused to hear any other verdict. 12 Rojas 
Pinilla claimed that the government had been committing 
electoral fraud for months. He added that party officials 
had been threatened and that buses used by his followers 
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were stopped. "I dare say the fraud has been so scandalous 
that friends of Mr. Pastrana still have not stopped casting 
their ballots," he declared. 13 
In another effort to subdue ANAPO, President Lleras 
warned that he would invoke more severe measures if the 
situation warranted it. However, with the imposition of 
the state of siege and the curfew, the momentum of Rojas 
Pinilla had been broken. In order to make sure that the 
ANAPO leaders did not create any more trouble, Lleras 
ordered the arrest of many top leaders and placed Rojas 
Pinilla under house arrest. He did the latter under the 
pretext that he was protecting Rojas from subversive ele-
ments within his own movement. The military surrounded the 
block around Rojas' home and let no one enter without a 
military escort. 14 Rojas replied that detentions were 
12El Sig lo (April 22, 1970)' p. 8. 
-
13El Tiem;eo (April 22, 1970)' p. 8. 
14El Tiempo (April 23, 1970)' p. 9. 
·illegal and arbitrary, and he called for his immediate 
:release. All of Rojas' threats of further violence never 
materialized. An official of ANAPO stated: 
The objective analysis of the present situa-
tion leads one to the unquestionable conclusion 
thatthe.prese.nt government is the real cause of 
the current violence. The government is creating 
an explosive climate whose inevitable consequence 
will not be delayed for long. It was done by 
.preparing and consummating fraud by encarcerating 
our leader and his family, by preventing through 
force the ANAPO leaders' ability to observe the 
vote t~bulation, and by abolishing the freedom of 
assembiy, and by undermining the already scarce 
gains of the workers through the government's 
drastic repressive measures •••• 15 
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The voting tabulation continued at a near snail's pace 
due to the remoteness of some areas of the country, as well 
as other reasons. After three days of counting, Pastrana 
had only a 50,000 vote lead over Rojas. The vote count was 
terminated on April 26 with the declaration of Pastrana as 
the unofficial victor, pending confirmation of the official 
recount which would·be completed in June. The final vote 
tally is indicated in T~ble rrr. 16 
15El Sig'lo (May 14, 1970), p. 11. 
16The first question which·came to some people's minds 
upon reading the results was, "who is Rafael Corredor," 
since his name was never mentioned during the campaign. 
After some investigation it was found that Corredor had 
placed a bet with several friends that Sourdis would not 
finish last. This seemed to be a safe bet for his friends 
since almost everyone predicted that Sourdis would finish 
last. But what Corredor did not say was that he himself 
had filed for the presidency so that he would finish last 
and thus be able to collect his bets. 
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TABLE III 
FINAL VOTE TABULATION 
Name Votes Per Cent 
Misael Pastrana Borrero 1,625,025 40.3 
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 1,561,468 38.9 
Belisario Betancur Cuartas 471,350 11. 7 
Evarl.sto Sourdis Juliao 336,286 8.3 
Rafael Corredor 11 o.o 
Blank/Void Votes 42,318 1. 0 
4,036,458 100.2 
Source: Registraduri.a Nacional de Estadi.stica. 
Since the government had successfully blocked all other 
options open to him, Rojas Pinilla now based his position on 
electoral fraud. He claimed that his occurred in various 
forms such as moral and physical coercion, alteration of 
identification cards, violation of seals on the ballot boxes, 
and a biased selection of vote counters. 17 Rojas said, 
" ••. we have not recognized and we will not recognize the 
victory of the National Front candidate • 
continue to be an enemy of the system. 1118 
17El Tiempo (May 14, 1970), p. 6. 
18El Tiempo (April 29, 1970), p. 6. 
ANAPO will 
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However, there were inconsistencies in the ANAPO posi-
tion on electoral fraud, which indicates that the party may 
not have believed that there really had been any. Marco A. 
Castrano, an ANAPO official, stated that, based on his 
observations, "up to this moment no irregularity had been 
seen for the purpose of committing fraud. 1119 Rojas himself 
later admitted that there had been no fraud during the 
ballot count or the registering of voters. These statements 
are in accord with what the author heard from an official of 
the United States embassy, who observed part of the ballot 
counting process. 
Despite the frivolity of these charges of fraud, the 
government ordered an investigation, if for no other reason 
. than to assure the la:tge following of Rojas that they had 
not been cheated. To ignore these charges might have under-
mined the legitimacy of Pastrana's claim to the presidency. 
President Lleras carefully explained to the public the 
process used in tabulating the votes and how the persons 
were selected who counted the ballots. He further appointed 
a special committee to investigate all claims of electoral 
fraud presented by responsible indiyiduals. The committee 
then was to report thei.r findings to the president and to 
the public. The newspaper El Siglo claimed that there had 
been serious fraud in the departments of Putumayo, Bolivar, 
and Santander. After investigating these claims and others, 
19El Tiempo (April 27, 1970), p. 6. 
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the committee published its final report on May 5, 1970, 
which stated that.it had discovered no fraud during the 
election. 
Thus the g·overnment had succeeded in immobilizing ANAPO, 
at least long enough for it to regain control of the situa-
tion. President Lleras applied only the amount of pressure 
needed .to maintain control of the situation and to keep the 
leaders of ANAPO off balance. The government handled the 
situation, giving the appearance, if not in fact, of oper-
ating openly and within the constitution. The government 
lifted the curfew on May 15 and the state of siege on 
May 16. 
B. Consequences of the Election 
To read the speeches of the political leaders after the 
election, one might get the impression that the losers had 
won and that the victors had lost. Some people, such as 
Saturnine Sepulveda Nino, claimed that the political domi-
nance of the traditional parties had come to an end. 20 Other 
persons proclaimed that a viable third party had been crea-
ted. In reviewing the election Rojas Pinilla said: 
The mistake committed by the governments of 
the National Front has been to seek the develop-
ment of the country while ignoring the human 
factor. They have sought .progress but at a high 
social cost. I, on the other hand, advocate a 
harmonic and ordered development of Colombia with-
out forgetting that the progress cannot be 
20sepulveda Nino. This was the basic argument of the 
book. 
accomplished by burdening the populace with taxes 
and other measures which rai.se the cost of living. 
This only brings hunger and misery to millions of 
Colombians. It seems that the only goal of the 
National Front is to balance the budget, decree 
new taxes, weaken the buying power of the currency, 
and put the nation into debt • . • • As far as 
concrete solutions to the tremendous problem of 
unemployment, the country is not aware of any 
realistic measures. Everything has been planning, 
programming, and concern; but nothing clear and 
concrete. On the other hand the country has been 
poorly informed of the deeds of the government and 
of the previous two administrations which have pre-
cipitated the crisis.21 
The two splinter candidates who were defeated at the 
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polls also acted as if they were the victors in fact. Evar-
isto Sourdis said that the top leaders of both traditional 
parties had been soundly defeated. 22 Belisario Betancur 
analyzed the election in this fashion: 
• . • the people like this crisis because they 
know and feel that, through it, the long-awaited 
opportunity has come to change the state of things 
and some rules of the game which were not in accord-
ance with their hopes or needs.23 
While the losers were proclaiming their moral victory, 
the leaders of the two traditional parties began to assess 
the effects of the election on their respective organiza-
tions. Most leaders who supported Pastrana accepted the 
election results as a challenge to the traditional parties. 
The challenge was to overcome the problems which had preci-
pitated the rise of Rojas Pinilla. This section is concerned 
21El Siglo (May 3, 1970), p. 14. 
22El Tiempo (May 9, 1970), p. 6. 
23 Ibid. 
only with what these leaders planned, rather than actions 
taken, since to pursue the latter would not have a direct 
bearing on the topic under study. 
President Lleras called for the reassessment of the 
social situation in Colombia and a program to increase 
social change. He called upon Colombians to look at the 
·reality of the situation and then to make the necessary 
sacrifices to carry out the needed reforms. II what 
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the country needs to reunite the people is to study the 
true situation of the country and to seek solutions for the 
problems," Lleras said. 24 
Other political leaders analyzed the structure and 
organization of the political parties in order to determine 
what went wrong. Turbay Ayala, of the Liberal Party, 
believed that Rojas Pinilla was able to do well because 
ANAPO had better organization, more effective communication 
with the masses, and the ability to identify with the as-
pirations of the lower classes. 25 Other political leaders 
felt that the parties had abandoned their traditional posi-
tions on the issues. Some blamed the crisis on insolent 
party leaders. 
President-elect Pastrana met the situation by re-
emphasizing his campaign theme of a national dialogue. He 
said he was willing to cooperate with any group to arrive 
24Ibid. 
25El Colombiano (May 31, 1970), p. 24. 
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at a synthesis of national aspirations and to arrive at 
effective solutions to the problems facing Colombia. Pas-
trans felt that the mood of the country would permit nothing 
short of positive action for social reforms, especially in 
the areas of underemployment and unemployment. 26 Pastrana 
further tried to gain support by emphasizing the basic 
problems of the poor: unemployment, housing, education, 
health, and social security. He stated: 
With the critical spirit which characterizes 
us, it has been said that today commissions are 
not needed and the people look with displeasure on 
the organization of committees because the people 
only hope for and demand solutions . . . . The 
National Front has made a tremendous effort in the 
areas of infrastructure and social progress • . . 
it is certain that with the impact of increasing 
· ·population and growing urbanization the satisfied 
demands have fallen short before new demands, and 
from this undeniable truth we should work with all 
our efforts . . We cannot become lost in ab-
stract programs • • • frontal and decisive attack 
on misery.27 
As might be expected after such a close election, the 
question did arise concerning who was to blame for the near 
defeat. One interesting note after reading the various 
a~cusations is that no responsible party official blamed the 
0ther traditional party for the crisis, which is another 
example of the National Front's primary goal being achieved. 
In fact, Pastrana publicly praised the support he received 
f'rom the Liberal Party: ". • . the Liberal Party complied 
26 . 
El Colombiano (May 15, 1970), p. 17. 
27El Tiempo (April 30, 1970), p. 6. 
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·with its initial promises, which resulted in support at the 
same high level as the party offered at the beginning of the 
• II 2 8 campaign. 
The leaders of the Conservative Party received some 
abuse from the rank and file of the party. Some accused 
Ospina P~rez of forcing a poor candidate onto the party as 
. . 29 
the reason for their near demise. However, the Liberal 
Party faced greater internal problems than the Conservatives. 
The Liberal Party did not function as well as expected and 
there was a strong movement to remove the party leader, 
Augusto Espinosa Valderrama, who many felt precipitated the 
party crisis. Many people felt. that the Liberal leaders had 
lost contact with the people they were representing, which 
tarnished the party's image as supporter of the urban masses. 
Many Liberals wanted a special party convention to select a 
new governing board, but they could not agree on who should 
be the delegates. Finally, on April 24, prominent Liberal 
leaders met at which time the leadership offered their 
resignations, thus clearing the way for a new Liberal con-
vention to select their replacements. 
Thus in reviewing the electoral crisis the political 
elites of Colombia realized that much work lay ahead if they 
were going to maintain control over the country. They would 
have to make an increased effort to involve the masses in 
28 rbid. 
29El Siglo (April 21, 1970), p. 2. 
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the development of the country in such a way that they 
received tangible benefits from it. The elite had received 
a very strong warning that, if they continued with the 
policies of the past, they could very easily lose their con-
trol over the country to someone like Rojas Pinilla. 
C. Voting Patterns 
This section is a preliminary attempt to analyze the 
results of the 1970 presidential election. It is termed 
preliminary because there is a scarcity of survey data 
available; thus heavy reliance is placed on aggregate data. 
What survey data are available are in a study published by 
the'Departamento Administrative Nacional de Estadistica 
(D.A.N.E.), which was a survey study in the city of Cali, 
the third largest city in the country. The aggregate data 
used below were found in the ~egistradur1a Nacional de 
Eistadistica which published a ,book containing the election 
results in each town divided into their respective depart-
ments. As stated above, the data provided by the latter 
source are not completely accurate, as is usual in most 
Latin American government statistics. Besides the expected 
errors in complying the data, the author has discovered at 
least one error in totaling the number of votes cast in a 
'town. 
Rather than formulating the research questions and then 
applying the data to them, this section will try to answer 
those questions which can be handled with the information 
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available. Some of the propositions raised in this section 
are as follows: Did the election results show as great a 
defeat for the National Front as it seemed after reviewing 
. the campaign rhetoric? How well did Pastrana and Rojas fare 
·in the major cities and in the countryside? What were some 
of the socio-economic characteristics of the supporters of 
the two leading candidates? Finally, how did these two 
candidates fare in the areas of traditional Conservatives or 
Liberal strength? 
Table IV groups the presidential candidates by their 
loyalty to the National Front. Even though both Betancur 
and Sourdfs strongly opposed Pastrana, there was nothing in 
their campaigns, rhetoric or action, which would lead one to 
believe they would subvert the National Front if elected. 
The votes listed in the table as undetermined consist of 
ballots cast for Rafael Corredor and those which were voided. 
The latter was included in that category, since they could 
result from unintentional error as well as from protest 
votes. This table indicates that the National Front, when 
all three candidates are taken together, did not fare that 
poorly. In fact it did as well as it had the last time a 
Conservative was the presidential candidate. The percentage 
of votes received by Rojas was only 10 per cent higher than 
ih the previous presidential election in 1966. All this 
leads to the conclusion that the crisis did not occur 
because of some tremendous rise on the part of Rojas Pinilla, 
but rather because the National Front declined. 
TABLE IV 
FINAL VOTE TABULATION BY PROPONENTS AND 
OPPONENTS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT 
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Name Votes Per Cent 
Misael Pastrana Borrero 
Belisario Betancur Cuartas 
Evaristo Sourdis Juliao 
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 
Blank 
Undetermined 
1,625,025 
471,350 
336,286 
2,432,661 
1,561,468 
36,892 
1,598,360 
5,437 
Source: Registraduria Nacional de Etadistica. 
60.3 
39.6 
0.1 
The socio-economic characteristics of the supporters of 
the two principal candidates were found to be in accord with 
the general impressions which the author had received while 
in Colombia. Table V shows the results in Colombia's ten 
largest cities, listed in their order of size. These cities 
are important to the election results because they repre-
sent 1,354,771 votes, or 33.6 per cent of the total ballots. 
This table shows that Rojas Pinilla won all but two of these 
cities, having won a plurality in the seven largest cities 
in the country. Even if one were to extend the list to 
include all departmental capitals or even further to encom-
pass all towns with more than 25,000 possible voters, the 
percentages would vary no more than .5% from the totals 
given in the table. 
TABLE V 
FINAL.VOTE TABULATION BY ROJAS AND PASTRANA 
IN COLOMBIA'S MAJOR CITIES 
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Total Votes Per Cent Total Vote 
City Rojas . Pastrana Rojas Pastrana. 
Bogota 253,562 224,406 45.0 39.8 
Medell.in 84,098 72,982 43.6 37.9 
Cali 74,907 63,907 46.4 39.6 
Barranquilla 51,102 16,778 38.7 12.7 
Bucaramanga 40,547 22,969 58.5 33.1 
cu cu ta 30,838 17,028 59.3 32.3 
Cartagena 22,941 15,658 44.4 30.3 
Manizales 13,361 16,049 27.9 33.5 
Pereira 13,903 22,862 28.7 47.2 
Ibague 15,611 13,516 44.9 38.9 
TOTALS 600,870 486,150 44.4 35.9 
Source: Registradur.ia Nacional de Estadistica. 
The next three tables were compiled by survey research 
in a study of Cali, Colombia's third largest city, pub-. 
lished by D.A.N.E. Table VI indicates the relationship 
between social class and the election results. This shows 
that Pastrana received his strongest support from the upper 
Upper 
Candidate Pre 
Pastrana 65.8 
Rojas 3.8 
Betancur 11. 4 
Sourdl.s 3.8 
Abstention 12.7 
TOTAL 100.0 
TABLE VI 
CALI VOTING BY SOCIAL CLASS, PER CENT 
PRE-ELECTORAL AND POST-ELECTORAL 
Class Middle Class Working Class 
Post Pre Post Pre Post 
76.4 32.3 43.7 23.8 26.8 
0.0 17·. 3 14.4 24.3 18.2 
9.8 8.3 12.7 5.7 6.3 
2.0 2.2 2.3 ** ** 
12.0 33.1 25.9 41. 6 44.3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
** = not given in original report 
Source:· · De:eartarnen to Administrative Nacional de Estadl.stica. 
Lower 
Pre 
22.1 
30.0 
6.3 
. 5 
37.2 
100.0 
Class 
Post 
17.9 
37.0 
3.6 
.1 
39.0 
100.0 
l.O 
U1 
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class while Rojas Pinilla received almost no support at all 
frem this same group. Rojas' support came mainly from the 
working and lower classes. Table VII shows the relationship 
between age and the vote. After breaking ages into groups 
of· ten years, one finds that Pastrana received a majority of 
votes from those people aged in their fifties and sixties. 
Rojas Pinilla, on the other hand, earned a majority of votes 
from those persons Jn their twenties. This seemed to indi-
cate that one of the contentions of the National Front 
leadership--that one of the. reasons for the increasing 
support of Rojas Pinilla was that they did not remember what 
' it was really like under the dictatorship in the 1950s--was 
well founded. Table VIII de,,scribes the relationship between 
social class and the vote in certain neighborhoods in Bogota 
and.Medellin, the country's.second largest city. These 
results tend to correlate with Table VI in terms of social 
class and the vote; In those two cities Pastrana won a 
majority of votes from.the upper and middle class neighbor-
hoods while Rojas Pinilla won a majority in the lower class 
ar.eas. 
Table IX lists some of the common responses given to 
the question, Why did a per.son vote for a certain candidate? 
This question was submitted to the people of Cali and also 
. d b . 1 . 11. 30 in a survey one y Mi es Wi iams. In the case of the 
Cali study, the list is merely given as typical responses, 
30 ;11' 154 155 Wi iams, pp. - • 
Candidate 
Pastrana 
Rojas 
Betancur 
TOTALS 
N = 
Source: 
TABLE VII 
CALI PRESIDENTIAL VOTE BY AGE -
PRE-ELECTORAL PERCENTAGES 
21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-0ver 
34.2 43.3 44.8 50.6 60.7 
54.4 44.1 40.3 44.0 30.8 
11. 4 12.6 14.9 5.4 8.5 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
193 215 134 75 94 
Depart,amento Administrativo Nacional de 
Estadi-stica. 
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Total 
44.2 
44.4 
11. 4 
100.0 
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while in the national 'study by Williams, he cites some per-
centages of those giving a certain response. The responses 
given to both surveys were relatively similar. In essence 
the people said that they suppm;-ted Rojas Pinilla because of 
his program; others voted for Pastrana because he represented 
the National Front. 
Tables X and XI are based on a study of the 1970 presi-
dential election as divided into departments grouped 
according to the way.in which they stipported the traditional 
parties in the past. The party loyalties were determined by 
B-en Burnett in his doctoral dissertation in 1957. 31 Through 
his study of Colombian elections between 1930 and 1948 (the 
31Bu~nett, pp. 83-111. 
TABLE VIII 
OFFICIAL RESULTS IN STRATIFIED AREAS, BOGOTA AND MEDELLIN 
,Lower Lower 
Candidate Upper Upper Middle Middle Lower Marginal Total 
.. 
BOGOTA 
Pa st:i;an.a 75.8 67.0 56~4 35.5 27.8 11. 8 40.8 
_Rojas 8.3 11. 9 19.5 50.0 62.7 '84.2 44.6 
Betancur 11.9 17.6 20.9 13.0 8.3 3.0 12.6 
Sourdis 3.5 3.0 2.4 .8 .3 ** 1.2 
Blank .4 • 5 • 8 .7 • 8 1.2 .8 
TOTALS 100.0 100.0 100.0 10040 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N = 21,499 22,668 61,073 67,895 131,417 7,875 312,427 
MEDELLIN 
Pastrana 74.2 57.2 23.0 36.7 
Rojas 7.5 16.5 64.5 46.9 
Betancur 16.5 24.8 11. 4 15.2 
Sourdis 1. 2 • 9 .2 .4 
Blank .5 .6 .7 .7 
TOTALS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N = 9,080 20,218 55,013 84,311 
** = not given in original report. 
Source: · Departamento Administrative Nacional.de.Estadistica. 
\0 
00 
TABLE IX 
TYPICAL REASONS FOR VOTING FOR PASTRANA AND ROJAS 
Rojas Pinilla 
T support his program (49.8%). 
To achieve a change in the system (17.0%). 
Offer of economic aid to the poor (27.0%). 
He is the candidate of the poor. 
··Because he understands the situation. 
He is against the oligarchy. 
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I am bored with the rest and I want to stop the rising cost 
of living. 
Rojas is interested in the economic situation of the un-
employed. 
Rojas--we want a change. 
I do not agree with the government of Lleras. 
Pastrana Borrero 
To continue the National Front (33.0%). 
For his program (18.4%). 
I vote for Pastrana, f.or peace and progress. 
The candidate who offers more guarantees. 
To continue the work of Lleras. 
He is from the National Front. 
He has a policy which coincides 'with that of the National 
Front. 
The others are not acceptable and promise much. 
He is best prepared to lead the country. 
So that the country does not fall into civil war. 
Sources: Williams, pp. 154-1~5 (those with percentages 
given), and Departamento Administrativo Nacional 
de Estad.l.stica. 
TABLE X 
TOTAL VOTE BY DEPARTMENT ACCORDING TO TRADITIONAL PARTY LOYALTY 
Total Vote Per Cent Vote Total Vote Per Cent Vote 
Department Pastrana Rojas Pastrana Roja13 N. F. Rojas N. F. Rojas 
·LIBERAL PARTY 
Cundinamarca 332,159 329,327 42~1 41.8 466,367 329,327 56.6 41. 8 
Santander 88,453 126,563 36.2 51. 9 115, 889 ---i.26, 563 47.5 51.9 
,Tolima .. 74,140 62,401 45.1 38.6 94,507 62,401 57.7 38.6 
Atlantico 32,682 63,120 16.3 31.5 137,901 63,120 68.3 31.5 
Choc6 .. 19,08-5 3,932 52.4 10.8 32,461 3,932 89.0 10.8 
TOTALS 546,519 585,343 39.6 40.9 846,_315 585,343 59.1 40.9 
CONSERVATIVE PARTY 
Antioquia 190,842 191,641 41. 3 41.5 265,756 191,641 57.5 41. 5 
Narine 86,i59 35,128 56.7 23.1 116,895 35,128 76.8 23.1 
Hui la 67,783 27,645 63.7 26.0 78,343 27,645 73.6 26.0 
Caldas 118,545 89,734 40.8 31.0 197,293 89,734 68.1 31. 0 
TOTALS 463,429 344,148 45.9 34.1 658,287 344,148 65.1 34.1 
COMPETITIVE 
val le 157,723 194,746 38.3 47.3 211,041 194,746 51.2 47.3 
Boy a ca 71,531 110,585 35.9 55.4 87,563 110,585 43.9 55.4 
N. Santander 63,873 59,906 46.9 44.8 75,768 59,906 55.6 44.8 
Cauca 70,384 26,646 58.8 22.3 92,466 26,646 77.2 22.3 
Magdalena 62,125 87,574 25.6 36.1 154,937 87,574 63.8 36.1 
Bolivar 80,777 59,621 33.5 24.8 181,054 59,621 75.1 24.8 
TOTALS 506;41~ 539,078 37.5 39.9 802,829 539,078 59.4 39.9 
I-' 
Source: Registraduria Nacional de Estadistica. 0 0 
TABLE XI 
TOTAL VOTE BY DEPARTMENT BY TRADITIONAL PARTY LOYALTY, EXCEPT CAPITAL 
Total Vote Per Cent Vote Total Vote Per Cent Vote 
Department Pastrana Rojas Pastrana Rojas N. F. Rojas N. F. Rojas 
LIBERAL PARTY 
Cundinamarca 107,753 75,765 47.9 33. 7 142,078 75,765 63.1 33.7 
Santander 65,484 86,016 37.5 49.2 87,726 86,016 50.2 49.2 
Tolima 60,624 46,790 47.8 36.9 76,301 46,790 60.2 36.9 
·Atlantico 15,904 12,018 23.2 17.5 56,418 12,018 82.3 17.5 
Choc6 14,537 2,638 55.5 10.1 23,486 2,638 89.7 10.1 
TOTALS 264,302 223,227 42.5 35.9 386,009 223,227 62.1 35.9 
CONSERVATIVE PARTY 
Antioquia 117,860 107,543 43.8 39.9 158,613 107,543 58.9 39.9 
Nari no 75,306 21,737 61.8 17.8 100,105 21,737 82.1 17.8 
·Huila 51,844 18,141 64.9 22.7 61,648 18,141 77.1 22.7 
Caldas 68,493 50,749 42.3 31. 3 109,902 50,749 67.8 31. 3 
TOTALS 313,503 198,170 49.5 31.3 430,268 198,170 68.0 31. 3 
COMPETITIVE 
Valle 93,836 119,839 37.4 47.8 127,402 119,839 50.8 47.8 
Boyaca 67,461 102,002 36.4 55.0 82,359 102,002 44.4 55.0 
N. Santander 46,845 29,068 55.7 34.6 54,884 29,068 65.3 34.6 
Cauca 63,625 20,525 63.6 20.5 79,135 20,525 79.1 20.5 
Magdalena 47,822 54,430 26.5 30.2 125,524 54,430 69.6 30.2 
Bolivar 59,765 29,192 34.6 11.1 143,628 29,192 83.1 11.1 
TOTALS 379,354 355~~ 0 56 38.6 36.5 612,932 355,056 63.0 36.5 
I-' 
0 
Source: Registraduria Nacional de Es.tadistica. I-' 
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last competitive election in Colombia before 1974), he 
grouped the departments into strong Liberal areas, strong 
Conservative areas, and competitive areas where neither party 
was dominant. The conclusions reached from these tables, 
however, can only be tentative and subject to further 
research because of the possibility that these patterns 
could have changed between 1948 and 1970 due to mortality 
as well as political change. An additional difficulty in 
compiling these tables is that the number of departments 
has changed since the original study was made. In 1960 the 
departments of Quindio and Risaralda were derived from 
Caldas, Sucre from Bolivar, and La Guajira and Cesar from 
Magdalena. For the purposes of these tables, these new 
departments were re-incorporated into their old structure. 
Burnett's study did not include any of the departments or 
territories of the Eastern plains nor some of them in the 
South, so these have been eliminated from the tables as 
well. 
These tables are both divided into two parts. The left 
column shows the relationship between Pastrana and Rojas in 
both raw votes and percentages. The right column indicates 
the relationship between the three candidates within the 
National Front combined and Rojas Pinilla. The abbreviation 
N. F. refers to the combination of the three candidates. 
Table X encompasses the entire department while Table XI 
considers the department after the departmental capital has 
been controlled. This control is made to determine if the 
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urban areas, a strong area of ANAPO support, made any dif-
ference in the results. 
From these two tables one can see that Pastrana was 
successful only in the departments where the Conservatives 
had been aominant, and then only by a plurality rather than 
a majority if the entire department is considered. Table X 
indicated that Rojas Pinilla carried the departments which 
Burnett found.the parties to be competitive and in the 
areas where the Liberal Party dominated. Table XI shows the 
same relationship as the previous table; however, each of 
the percentages are more favorable to Pastrana in the areas 
of Conservative· domination in that he received a plurality 
in each group where previously he had won in only one. This 
table also reinforces the findings in previous tables by 
indicating that the strength of Pastrana lay in the more 
rural areas of the country. In both tables the relationship 
between Rojas Pinilla and the combined forces of the National 
Front candidates showed that the Front was stronger in the 
Conservative areas than elsewhere, even though they did win 
a majority in each grouping. 
As stated above, this stu9y is by no means a complete 
analysis of the 1970 presidential election returns, but one 
based on the data already available. There are several 
areas of information which should be developed in further 
survey research. One is the relationship between sex and 
the voter to determine if the fact that Rojas gave women the 
right to vote had any effect on this election. Second is a 
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more recent update on the relationship between party identi-
fication and which candidate a person supported. A third is 
a study of the opinions of people concerning various politi-
cal leaders, made in an attempt to determine the reasons for 
disaffection for the National Front. 
D. Conclusions 
This chapter has studied the events after election day 
to determine what happened, the government's reaction to the 
events, and other people's reactions to the government mea-
sures. These events have given several instances from which 
a person could strongly suspect that some of the basic 
precepts of the National Front, as outlined above, had been 
accomplished. In the face of severe crisis, the traditional 
parties never indicated that the coalition might dissolve. 
Instead they cooperated to surmount the crisis through the 
use of restrained force; that is, they did not over-react 
to the challenge presented by Rojas Pinilla. They also con-
ducted their operations in the open, allowing frequent 
publication of correspondence between Rojas and President 
Lleras. Even though there was a period of introspection 
after the election within the Conservative and Liberal 
parties, the leadership of both parties began to take the 
necessary measures to correct any deficiencies in the party 
organization or policies. The analysis of the voting data 
indicated that there was still strong support for the 
traditional parties and their coalition, although support 
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for the 1970 candidate was certainly less than overwhelming. 
By· breaking the vote down into socio-economic and political 
characteristics, one can get a better understanding of which 
type· of people were most likely to have voted against the 
National Front, either because of its personalities or of 
its policies. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Colombian experiment in coalition government has 
been a unique experience in Latin America in that the parti-
cipants predetermined the length of time the coalition would 
last and then incorporated the provisions which established 
the coalition directly into the national constitution. The 
Liberal and the Conservative parties had formed this coali-
tion in order to restore political peace and economic order 
to a country which had been devastated by the Violent Era 
and the Rojas dictatorship. It has been argued that the 
goal of the National Front was the establishment of political 
peace. For all intents and purposes this was achieved in 
the early 1960s, although economic problems still confronted 
the government. These problems increased the prospects for 
a major challenge td National Front rule in the 1970 presi-
4ential election. 
The election crisis can be broken down into one main 
element and three catalytic elements. The main element was 
the near election of a former dictator, Rojas Pinilla, who 
openly advocated the end of the elite's control over the 
government. Evidence that Rojas would attempt such a move 
was already seen in his creation of the Third Force, a new 
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political party he organized in the 1950s to counteract the 
power of the Liberal and Conservative parties. One of the 
catalytic elements was the weakness of the National Front 
candidate. Pastrana Borrero was the weakest candidate pre-
sented by the National Front in that he received the lowest 
per cent ,of the votes of any previous Front candidate. The 
second catalytic element was the economic situation in the 
country. Even though the elites had made significant pro-
gress in rebuilding the economy, much of this improvement 
was not evident to the masses in the form of higher standards 
of living. Rojas Pinilla took advantage of the economic 
situation by advocating a program which at least seemed to 
offer the lower classes an immediate improvement in their 
way of life. 
One of the consequences of the National Front was an 
increased incidence of factionalism, the third catalytic 
element. Granted that both political parties have split in 
the past, but there seem to have been even more divisions 
under the National Front than before. Examples of this 
increased factionalism include the formation of the Liberal 
Revolutionary Movement from the Liberal Party soon after the 
National Front was formed, the separate candidacy of Beli-
sario Betancur before the Conservative nominating convention 
was even held, the additional splintering of the Conserva-
tive Party during the nominating convention, and finally the 
internal struggles within the Liberal Party to determine who 
was at fault for the relatively poor showing of the Liberals 
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in the election. Thus ii is concluded that the incidence of 
facti6nalism under the National.Fi6nf increased. 
Because the Liberal and the Conservative parties had 
dominated the political lif~ of Colombia for generations, 
their unification would place the coalition into a similar 
position as that of a political party under a one-party 
dominant system, such as exists in Mexico. The campaign 
style of the National Front throughout most of the campaign 
was one of the candidate touring the country and explaining 
his programs to the people and to the local officials while 
paying virtually no attention to the opposition. 
However, once the coalition finally recognized the 
opposition's potential electoral strength, it reacted by 
dropping, for the most part, .the campaign style it had been 
using. In its place, the National Front used a style which 
one would find in a country with a multi-party system; that 
is, open recognition of the existence of the opposition and 
efforts to undermine its strength with the electorate. The 
National Front pursued this new policy with a gradual in-
crease in intensity. That means that at first the elites 
only made occasional speeches and the newspapers made 
periodic references to Rojas' misdeeds. However, near elec-
tion day, the voters were almost constantly being bombarded 
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w.ith anti-Rojas propaganda through speeches, editorials, 
advertisements, political cartoons, and other .similar 
measures. One can conclude, therefore, that elites in 
ColBmbia react to the challenge of a counter-elite that 
poses serious threats to their existence by openly con-
f~onting the challenger and by applying pressures against 
him in a gradually increasing manner. 
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